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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the contexts in which combatant masculinities were constructed: (a) in 
apartheid South Africa through mass mobilization and politicization; (b) in exile through 
military training; and (c) in post-apartheid South Africa through cultural concepts of 
manhood and non-governmental organisations' (NGOs) initiatives. 
This qualitative study, based on six in-depth interviews, follows through the three different 
contexts, the narratives of the same group of ex-combatants ofUmkhonto weSizwe (MK), the 
military wing of the African National Congress (ANC). These men went into exile as part of 
the 1980 generation. 
It concludes that the different contexts facilitated the construction of different masculinities. 
During resistance to apartheid, civilian struggle masculinities were made. Military training 
made militarised masculinities. Post 1994 marks the creation of masculinities in transition. 
Among the key factors shaping each of these masculinities are: political structures, 
ideological and political youth constructs; the totality of the military and a patriarchal and 
heterosexual discourse; and cultural concepts of manhood. This thesis outlines similarities 
and differences between the three types of masculinities as well as other broad themes that 
permeate the study. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explores the contexts in which combatant masculinities were constructed: (a) in 
apartheid South Africa through mass mobilization and politicization; (b) in exile through 
military training; and (c) in post-apartheid South Africa through cultural concepts of 
manhood and non-governmental organisations' (NGOs) initiatives. This qualitative study, 
based on six in-depth interviews, follows through the three different contexts, the narratives 
of the same group of ex-combatants of Umkhonto weSizwe (MK), the military wing of the 
African National Congress (ANC). These men went into exile as part of the 1980 generation. 
It begins with a literature review of relevant masculinity research over the last three decades. 
Chapter two charts the research methodology that frames and guides the study. Chapter three 
sets the context for the study. It focuses on education as a social and ideological instrument 
that engineered the lives of school-going black South Africans during apartheid. Resistance 
to Bantu Education put youth at the forefront of the national liberation struggle. 
Chapter four focuses on the politicisation of the research respondents as school students 
through their political activities both in communities and student political structures which 
culminated in their joining MK and leaving for exile. Chapter five examines how the military 
constructed a particular combatant masculine identity that served its ends. Here the interest is 
in how the military made new recruits' with cogs in its machine. Chapter six is primarily 
concerned with the life conditions of the respondents as returned soldiers who were not 
formally demobilized and reintegrated into their communities and society at large; and how 
they renegotiate and reconstruct their militarized masculine identities that have become 
redundant in post-liberation South Africa. The study concludes by asserting that the different 
contexts facilitated the construction of different masculinities (civilian struggle masculinity, 
militarised masculinity and masculinity in transition) respectively. Although context was 
salient, there were other processes at play that shaped these masculinities. Similarities and 
differences between the three types of masculinities are outlined as well as other broad 
themes that permeate the study. 
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CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 Masculinities 
Robert Morrell (1998) has noted that in the last 25 years researchers in the USA, UK and 
Europe had begun to invest themselves in the study of masculinity. Already by then there was 
growing literature on the subject and at some universities research on masculinity had 
claimed independence as Men's Studies. What has been called the first wave on men and 
masculinity research appeared in the mid 1970s as a result of feminist critiques of traditional 
explanations of gender differences (Kimmel and Messner, 1998). These early developments 
were for the most part debated in the context of American scholarship and politics (Morrell, 
1998). Some work such as that by Feigen-Fasteau's The Male Machine (1974) and Warren 
Farrell's The Liberated Man (1975) was concerned with the costs of the traditional male sex 
role on men's health both physically and psychologically and their relationships with women, 
other men and children (Kimmel & Messner, 1998). 
Several feminist inspired anthologies explored the meaning of masculinity in the USA such 
as the work of Joseph Pleck & Jack Sawyer (1974) Men and Masculinity and Deborah David 
& Robert Brannon (1976) The Forty Nine Percent Majority (Kimmel and Messner, 1998). 
Joseph Pleck's (1981) The Myth of Masculinity is posed as the single most salient work to 
have criticised the normative male sex role by deconstructing the constituents of the male sex 
role and showed that empirical literature did not support these normative features (Kimmel & 
Messner, 1998). Similar developments across the Atlantic were occurring that had strong left-
wing connections. Morrell (1998) holds that Andrew Tolson's (1977) The Limits of 
Masculinity, is one of the earliest books that reflected a growing concern about the lack of 
discussion and research about men at a time when feminism was generating compelling 
intellectual interest. 
At the beginning of the 1980s research on women once again led the way ahead of research 
on men and masculinity. The variations among men were seen as central to the understanding 
of men's lives. This challenged the unexamined assumption of earlier research that had 
portrayed one version of masculinity-white, middle-class, middle-aged, heterosexual, as the 
sex into which all men were struggle to fit in (Kimmel and Messner, 1998). The challenge to 
this normative definition of masculinity led to an understanding that we cannot speak of 
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masculinity but masculinities: "the ways in which different men construct different versions 
of masculinity" (Kimmel & Messner, 1998, p. xix). This perspective in the USA was 
reflected in the work of Harry Brod (1987) The Making of Masculinity and Michael Kimmel 
(1987) Changing Men: new Directions in Research on men and Masculinity (Kimmel & 
Messner, 1998). In the UK, Jeff Hearn (1987) The Gender of oppression: Men, Masculinity 
and the Critique of Marxism followed from Tolson's work in which he grappled with 'the 
men's question' by engaging with yet rejecting classical Marxist and feminist analyses 
(Morrell, 1998). The agenda of the study of men both in America and Britain according to 
Morrell (1998) was motivated by similar concerns and cannot be separated from each other. 
On the other hand McCarry (2007) maintains that historically the work from USA and the 
UK was stratified into 'Men's Studies' and 'Critical Men's Studies'. Both groups posited that 
their work was objectively and critically analysing masculinity and shared a political 
commitment with feminism but Pringle (2001) in McCarry (2007) argues that there was 
significant incongruity in these two approaches with the Critical Studies of men theorists 
being openly supportive of feminism and the broader project of Women's Studies and Gender 
Research. 
That said McCarry (2007) is quick to warn that it is reductive to designate male masculinity 
theorists as religiously aligned with either 'Men's Studies' or 'Critical Studies of Men'. Over 
time both came to be called 'pro-feminist' approaches to the study of masculinity and 
distinguished from a rival body of work that emerged as a reaction to feminism and an 
advocate of men's rights in the 1980s and 1990s such as Robert Bly (1992) Iron John, Sam 
Keen (1992) Fire in the Belly: On being a Man and Warren Farrell (1993) The Myth of Male 
Power: What men are the Disposable Sex (Morrell, 1998). 
In Australia, Bob Connell, a historian writing in the sociology discipline, in the 1980s started 
engaging with the theoretical problem of gender. Taking a holistic approach, Connell placed 
at the centre of his analysis, the unequal relationship between men and women and developed 
theories that culminated in the publication of Masculinities in 1995 (Morrell, 1998). 
Connell's work gave way to a dynamic understanding of masculinity and emphasised the 
salience of its historical development. Connell was part of a group of scholars that produced 
an approach known as the 'New Sociology of Men', the hallmark of which was the rejection 
of essentialist conceptions of men (Morrell, 1998). The issues raised by these scholars have 
been about the nature of men's power over women such as: how is power exercised, 
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maintained and perpetuated? What were its forms and where and by whom was it exercised? 
(Morrell, 1998). Furthennore, the approach suggested that some men were victims of gender 
domination and also argued that men paid a price for their domination. Morrell (1998) points 
out that some of the literature to come from this group of scholars includes: R. Chapman and 
J. Rutherford (Eds.) (1988) Male Order: Unwrapping Masculinity, Lynn Segal (1990) Slow 
Motion: Changing Masculinities, Changing Men, M. Messner & D. Sabo (Eds.), (1990) 
Sport, Men and Gender: Critical Feminist Perspectives, Victor Seidler (Ed.), (1992) 
Recreating Sexual Relationships: Writings from Achilles' Heel, Michael Kaufman (1994) 
Cracking the Armour: Power, Pain and Men's Lives, H. Brod & M. Kaufman (Eds.), (1994) 
Theorizing Masculinities, and M. Mac an Ghaill (Ed.), (1996) Understanding Masculinities: 
Social Relations and Cultural Contexts. 
Masculinities are not created equal. This means that different masculinities are not equally 
valued in our society. On the one hand, for Brittan (1989) masculinity refers to "different 
styles of masculinity or self-presentation" (cited in Haywood and Mac an Ghaill, 2003). He 
maintains that "styles of masculinity change but that the substance of male power does not" 
l(ibid.). On the other hand, Connell (1995) urges that we recognise the diversity in 
masculinities and the relations that obtain between them which he asserts are "relations of 
alliance, domination and subordination. These relations are constructed through practices that 
include and exclude, intimidate and exploit-gender politics" (p.37). To point out the 
relations that hold between masculinities Connell (1995) uses Gramsci' s (1971) concept of 
hegemony to describe hegemonic masculinity. In explaining hegemony Donaldson (1993) 
holds that the concept, as understood by Gramsci, is concerned with the ways in which the 
"ruling class establishes and holds its dominance over other social in-groups. It involves the 
persuasion of people through the media and social institutions in ways that seem ordinary and 
the punishment of non-conformity" (p.645). 
1.2 Masculinities in South Africa 
The forms that masculinity takes is constituted, among other factors, by race and class such 
that in any given society there are various masculinities, each with its characteristic shape and 
1 Apologies to the reader and examiners. I was unable to trace the page references for these quotations before 
the submission deadline as I could not access the text. 
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features (Morrell, 1998). These "contours and features change over time as they are impacted 
by changes in society while they too affect change in society" (Morrell, 1998, p. 607). This 
does not however, lead to the conclusion that "all masculinities, as social forces, are equally 
powerful" (ibid.) because as Connell's hegemonic framework shows, subordinate 
masculinities exist among marginalised masculinities and these may be oppositional to the 
dominant masculinity (ibid.). For purposes of this work it can, at the risk of over 
simplification, be conceived that the apartheid project that was spearheaded by white 
Afrikaner men laid claim to hegemonic masculinity in cultural, class, race, ideological and 
economic terms and through its use of violence and military power. On the other hand, men 
in the ANC and its allies constituted marginalised masculinities on the terms mentioned 
above. The Afrikaner hegemony was challenged by the ANC and its allies through the project 
of national liberation. In a discussion of South Africa masculinities Morrell identifies and 
distinguishes three types of masculinities: "white", "African" and "black" masculinities 
(ibid., 616). Attention here is given to African and black masculinities "without precluding 
the existence of subordinate masculinities within these concepts" (ibid., p.622). 
1.3 African masculinities 
By African masculinity, Morrell (1998) is referring to those masculinities that were 
developed in rural localities and which he also refers to as 'rural masculinity' or 'countryside 
masculinity' (p. 622). He further notes that in the city, where they worked, these men strived 
to maintain their rural masculine identities using forms of organising that they were familiar 
with. For example, Morrell argues that in Durban, Zulu men "banded together and formed 
ethics and codes of masculine conduct that affirmed their rural roots" (p. 623). The 
"prohibition of permanent residence to most Africans allowed for the extension, into the city, 
of this rural African masculinity" (ibid) and although township life influenced the way 
masculinity was understood, "African masculinity appears to have remained somewhat 
hegemonic" (ibid.). This is partly because these men, although working in the cities still had 
ties with their chiefs and headmen whom they consulted, they owned homesteads and 
accumulated livestock and had wives and children which were all benchmarks against which 
masculinity was measured. Moreover, migrant men also understood their masculinity in 
terms of respect, given to them by younger men and particularly women (Morrell, 1998). 
"Here was an African masculinity removed from its material but not its cultural context 
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(Morrell, 1998, p. 625). 
The 1950s marked a particularly salient period, the effective functioning of the rural 
homesteads as places of economic independence and production came to an end. World War 
II had brought about a significant increase in the urban African population and despite 
apartheid's attempts to stem the process of permanent migration it failed to arrest the 
development of a "new urban culture" (Morrell, 1998, p. 624). At this time, Morrell observes, 
"industry expanded and a growing African working class was absorbed into jobs" now as 
residents rather than migrants. In light of these changes, civil society developed to "initiate 
Africans to an urban life with trade unions and political parties taking a lead in this regard" 
(1998, p. 625). These changes also saw the gradually formation of urban gangs which 
although they were not completely devoid of rural influence, were characterised by new 
styles of dress, modes of behaviour and open ridicule of rural simplicity. He notes that these 
changes were part of a process in which "a new black urban masculinity emerged rival the 
old and rejected it as a masculinity of the 'moegoe'" (ibid). 
1.4 Black masculinities 
African urban life was fertile ground for the new black masculinity. This masculinity was 
defined by being oppositional to the state and like African masculinity maintained traditional 
views about women's place and held work as a central feature of its identity (Morrell, 1998). 
Work in many ways was a passport into the city without which African men would be 
imprisoned and deported back to the rural homesteads. Morrell observes that the use of the 
word 'boy', to address black men, in South African English (by white men, women, boys and 
girls) expressed the workplace reality where African men were subjected to menial work as 
servants (1998, p. 161). Used to refer to grown men, the word 'boy' was a diminutive that 
reflected the emasculation of black men. The word signalled a refusal to acknowledge growth 
and achievement of manhood amongst African men which when combined with servitude 
became a feature of black masculinity (ibid). The "new black masculinity was a working 
class masculinity" that had little chance of upward or geographical mobility and was 
minimally paid (ibid., p. 626). Matters were further complicated by the "racialisation of 
labour by the apartheid government that set off violent competition in the labour market" 
(ibid). 
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As the apartheid economy continued to expand and many urban African men held jobs, black 
masculinity expressed its opposition in politics. Despite this opposition being radical, its 
leaders and symbols of masculinity were that of professional men with higher education such 
as Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela (Morrell, 1998). In the 1970s the economy began to 
falter, repression rose and black men turned to violence as a coping strategy. Campbell 
(1992) holds the view that "apartheid and capitalism limited the power of working class men" 
(p. 618), undermined their masculinity thus, bringing about a crisis of African masculinity 
that among other ways was reasserted through violent means (ibid). The youth emerged as a 
"social force often becoming tsotsis, petty criminals and gangsters. It was in these groups, 
that an oppositional black masculinity first emerged and later in school and university 
students" Morrell, 1998, p. 627). 
Political opposition created an important space for the reassertion of male dominance through 
the emphasis on violence as a means to resolve political differences (Campbell, 1992). 
Violence and masculinity intertwined in the macho culture of resistance to apartheid. Youth 
as 'comrades' characterised themselves as "hard, ruthless and disciplined with no time to rest 
and no time for pleasure, as living under the constant threat of death, and prepared to sacrifice 
their very lives for the struggle if need be. References to the political struggle were often 
articulated in highly militaristic terms" (Campbell, 1992, p. 624). Xaba (2001) has also 
spoken of a 'struggle masculinity' which he sees as having been a socially constructed gender 
identity and as the type of masculinity that became dominant among young, urban Africans 
during the struggle in the 1980s; whose main feature was opposition to the oppressive state's 
(Bantu Education, worker exploitation, rents and rates) and political militancy (p. 108-109). 
Xaba's 'struggle masculinity' is a better concept to work with than Morrell's problematic 
distinction between' African' and 'Black' masculinities. Morrell seems to be claiming that 
'African' was rural but not 'Black' and that 'Black' was urban but not 'African'. This study 
does not accept this distinction and holds that African and Black can be both rural and urban 
just as Morrell acknowledges the flux that happened between rural and urban spaces. 
There is also growmg literature on masculinities in post-apartheid South Africa that is 
concerned with how men in this country are grappling with the changes and challenges 
brought about by the transition from apartheid to democracy. An example is a book edited by 
Morrell (2001) that comprises a range of essays on masculinities. It is in the same text that 
Xaba (2001) for example, shown the clashes between what he has called 'struggle 
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masculinity' of the 1980s and other forms of masculinities of post-apartheid South Africa. 
Xaba argues that the former has been deligitimised and is without political status in post-
apartheid South Africa and in response has attempted to reassert itself by killing, robbing and 
rapmg. 
Ratele (2001) working with a group of black professional men between the ages (24 and 30) 
used discourse analysis to analyse gender subjectivities and identities in language. He posed 
two questions: "What does it mean to be a black man in South Africa today? How does one 
become a black man?" (p. 241). To the former, answers included: being a black is what it has 
always been, very difficult; it is confusing; it means to be strong because being a black 
person is not easy; and it means being proud because now there's a chance "to show whites 
something" (ibid., p. 246). Responses to the latter question were not so clear and 
forthcoming. Ratele argues that this is because masculinities are difficult to grasp by those 
who do not theorise and research them (ibid., p. 247). 
Morrell (2002) has studied the collective responses of men to gender transitions in South 
Africa. In this study he identifies three different categories of responses: those who "protect 
privilege" (p. 316-319), those "responding to a crisis of masculinity (p. 319-321)" and those 
who "fight for gender justice" (p. 317-319). There is also ongoing research in the Nkomazi 
district of Mpumalanga in which Sideris (2003) in Walker (2005) is working with a group of 
older men in a rural setting who reject violence, do 'women's work', engage with human and 
gender rights and have relinquished control over family income. 
Research work in Kwa-Zulu Natal by Hunter (2003) on isoka masculinity (men who are 
successful with women) suggests that men are now more inclined to associate multiple sexual 
partners with irresponsibility than success. Hunter argues that this is partly due to the AIDS 
epidemic that has had an inhibiting effect on sexual practices. Lastly, Walker (2005) 
conducted in-depth interviews with young African working-class men in a study that 
explored new masculinities in contemporary South Africa. Walker argues that traditional 
versions and expressions of masculinity and male sexuality have been destabilised. There is a 
masculinity crisis in South Africa brought about by a transition to democracy and the 
adoption of the Constitution and a public discourse of human rights. Subsequently, being a 
man in South Africa is by necessity different yet "current models and practices of masculinity 
are historically embedded" (Walker, 2005, p.226). 
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Walker (2005) asserts that her research reflects the views of "a small group of men, who want 
and need to be different from their fathers, different from many of their peers-young men 
attempting to reclaim and remake their lives... Old masculinities have been exposed ... 
Confusion and uncertainty around the nature of masculinity and male sexuality, and the 
expectations men have of themselves, each other and women are contested, and in crisis, 
giving rise to new notions of manhood" (p. 236). This study's focus on ex-combatants 
expands the idea of 'masculinities in crisis' in post-apartheid South Africa. 
1.5 Military masculinities 
Considerable literature now exists that draws parallels between military activity and 
masculinity. Woodward (2000) highlights three issues that this literature raises. First, is the 
recognition that there are several models of military masculinity and that it is the relationship 
between these that is the basis for military organisation. Second, these models have been 
celebrated by different cultures at different times. Third, there are "connections between, on 
the one hand what Connell (1995) has called hegemonic masculinity and on the other hand, 
the dominant model of military masculinity, the warrior hero" (p.643). 
Military organisations have been and continue to be salient sites for the construction of 
masculinities (Morgan, 1994; Mankayi, 2006). Military training is an attempt to reconstruct 
'boys' into 'men' and 'civilians' into 'soldiers' and in that process it is men as soldiers who 
are constructed as 'warrior heroes' (Mankayi, 2006). Despite political, social and 
technological changes, the military still relies on the image of the 'warrior' for 
representations of masculinity (Morgan, 1994; Mankayi, 2006). Woodward writes: 
"The warrior is physically fit and powerful. He is mentally strong and unemotional. 
He is capable of both solitary, individual pursuit of his goals and self denying 
contribution to toward the work of the team. He's also a bit of a hero with a knack for 
picking up girls and is resolutely heterosexual. He is brave, adventurous, and prepared 
to take risks. Crucially, he possesses the abilities to conquer hostile environments, to 
cross unfamiliar terrain, and to lay claim to dangerous ground" (2000, p.643-44). 
This image of the warrior hero, aside from being constructed in Western conventional armies 
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is "a cultural icon that infonns military masculinity discourse and is not a tangible reality" 
(Woodward, 2000, p. 644). This however, is not to suggest that in MK the image of a warrior 
in the construction of soldiers and masculine identities may have not been invoked and 
mobilised as a model of heterosexual masculinity. The warrior hero is after all, "open to 
subversion, contradiction and reproduction" (ibid). Suttner (2008) has pointed out that in the 
ANC the importance placed on manhood appears to have been linked to a historical tradition 
that tied the struggle for freedom to heroic projects of previous generations that resisted 
conquest and oppression. In the conduct of anned struggle for example, cadres were 
"encouraged to see themselves 'picking up the spear' that had been dropped when Barnbatha 
and others died in the last armed rebellion before Union, in 1906" (Suttner, 2008, p. 117). 
The warrior image then, is the key symbol of masculinity depicted in popular films, heroic 
paintings, statues and comic books. Morgan notes that "facial expression, weaponry, and the 
stance all vividly embody aggression, courage and a capacity for violence. The unifonn 
absorbs individual identity into a body of men, a timeless masculinity devoid of emotion and 
subordinate only to a high rationality" (1994, p. 166). The military and war provide an 
opportunity for men to detach from the feminine by leaving behind their mothers, wives, 
sisters, and children. War and soldiering have strong gendered connotations and sexual 
divisions of labour. For example, he notes that "men are expected to enlist into the military 
(in conventional annies), are expected to fight or be prepared to fight and undergo military 
training" while on the other hand "women are prohibited from these activities (Morgan, 1994, 
p. 166). These expectations and prohibitions define not only who does what but who is what" 
(ibid). 
Masculinity is a powerful tool in the making of men into soldiers and the military an 
institutional sphere for its cultivation by requiring aggressiveness, competition and a censure 
of emotional expression while war provides the space for its validation (Cock, 1991). One of 
the links between the military and masculinity is the construction of the masculine body. 
Military training involves the disciplining and occasional mortification of the male body as it 
is shaped into a collective body of men (Morgan, 1994). In combat "the body is placed at 
risk, danger and damage, is subjected to unmediated physicality and deprived of food and 
sleep. The finality of physicality may be in the remains enclosed in a body bag" (Morgan, 
1994, p. 167). The course of military training is further elaborated by a heterosexist culture 
that revolves around socially constructed bodily needs and functions that are linked to 
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hegemonic definitions of masculinity (Morgan, 1994). It is in this culture that heterosexuality 
is constructed in a way that directly links women's bodies with the bodily needs of men. 
Conversely, this culture generates the homophobia generally found in the military 
establishment (Morgan, 1994). As an intrinsic feature of the discourse of hegemonic 
masculinity, sexuality and the values attached to it, serve to establish a hierarchy within 
masculinity and acts as a policing mechanism for individual men (Conway, 2003). Men who 
display or are perceived to display 'effeminate' traits are positioned at the bottom of the 
masculinity hierarchy, are subordinated and marginalised (Conway, 2003). If in the military 
there is an ideological emphasis on homosociability and heterosexuality, it is often a complex 
ideological unity with several and sometimes contradictory strands. 
Aside from this, there are contradictions within military life that point to complexities of the 
military institution. The individual warrior hero model exists in contrast to the heroism of 
"brothers in arms" (Morgan, 1994). The individual warrior hero is often portrayed in posters, 
brochures and recruitment literature as celebrating individualism and independent endeavour. 
The rural location provides a backdrop and challenge against which the infantry soldier as the 
warrior hero is pitted; a location in which emotions such as excitement, fear and a sense of a 
challenge can be stimulated and overcome (Woodward, 2000). Most of these images can be 
found in conventional armies but are however not exclusive to them as the book cover of 
Umkhonto we Sizwe by (Bopela and Luthuli, 2005) illustrate. See appendix 1 for this image. 
The contradiction is that the long standing trend has favoured the heroism of "brothers in 
arms" and not the individualism of the warrior hero (Morgan, 1994). Writing as far back as 
1945, Robert Nisbet observed that the military is primarily concerned with the attainment of 
its own ends. For this reason "nothing in military life is to be left to spontaneous adjudication 
by the individual, life is made a matter of precise regulation" (Nisbet, 1945, p. 264). Similarly 
Arkin & Dobrofsky (1978) assert that in actual fact the military'S definitions and expectations 
become the individual's definitions and expectation. The image of the masculine warrior hero 
with its attendant individualism appears to be simply unattainable, at least for two reasons. 
First, as has been pointed out, the military makes no provisions for individualism. Second, the 
warrior image is a normative definition of masculinity that offers a standard of what men 
ought to be (Connell, 1995) in the military or at least for the infantry soldier. The problem is 
that very few men can match the standards of this masculinity. Military operations, despite 
the emphasis placed on the warrior hero, generally discourage individualism and instead 
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heroism may be identified within particular units or divisions than with anyone individual. 
This makes contemporary armies an ideal site for the construction of abstract masculinities 
(Morgan, 1994). 
In fact the "army does not help you to know yourself: it teaches you to subjugate yourself and 
your own personality to something much bigger, which is why it can't cope with non-
conformists. In a way it brainwashes you: you not only wear a uniform, but you are, and you 
have to be, mentally in uniform yourself' (Parker cited Cock, 1991, p. 94). Part of the mental 
uniform is submission to authority, aggression toward the enemy and dehumanisation not 
only of the enemy but also of the self is inculcated in the making of soldiers (Cock, 1991). 
Gear (2002b) makes the same point when citing 10chelson (1987) who maintains that 
"dehumanisation begins with the regulation crew-cut and issuing of uniform and continues 
with verbal and physical abuse as the individual's self-image is reshaped. Men resign 
themselves to daily routinised activity over which they have no control, and accept the 
overall, unchangeable authority of the drill instructor and the military" (p. 81). This 
construction of the soldier identity is essentially gendered such that notions of masculinity are 
married with the process of training a soldier in which aggression against the enemy is fused 
with masculinity and sexual virility. In this process, women and femininity are regarded and 
despised as the enemy, the antithesis ofthe soldier (Gear, 2002b). 
Not all soldier trainees respond the same way to military life and training. While some remain 
stubbornly insubordinate, some abscond; become bored and frustrated by what they take as a 
waste of time and still others commit suicide. In combat, the military's ultimate manliness 
test, many experience it as chaotic, frightening and noisy. The acts of killing become 
nightmares that are repeated over and again in sweats and flashbacks (Gear, 2002b). Finally, 
research on the making of gendered militarised identities in South Africa's non-conventional 
liberation forces has been limited (Gear, 2002b) with the exception being Cock's (1991) work 
that began to investigate the position of women in MK. In perhaps yet another limited 
manner, this study contributes in the exploration of the constructions of militarised masculine 
identities in MK. 2 
2 There is a critical text on military masculinities, which I unfortunately was only able to access a day before this 
thesis was due for submission and was therefore unable to use in this study. See Higate, P. (2003). Military 
masculinities: Identity and the state. USA: Praeger Publishers 
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This chapter has attempted a review of literature on masculinity by first outlining what could 
be called its historical development that has its roots in Europe and the United States of 
America. The chapter also explores South African literature on the study of masculinities as 
well as the association between masculinities and the military. While this attempt is made the 
chapter comes short in incorporating recent literature that attends to the relationship between 
gender and militarisation. This shortcoming is as a result of a difficulty in accessing this 
literature as the footnote below indicates. On the other hand, the chapter fails to include wider 
literature on, for example, contemporary Turkey and Israel. The following chapter outlines 
the study's research methodology. 
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CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Purpose of the study 
Many scholars have pointed to the relationship between the military and constructions of 
masculinity. That is, the military as a prominent site in which particular types of masculine 
identities are constructed. South African literature on masculinity and on the military has 
given little attention in exploring this relationship. Some work in this area has been done by 
Cock (1991), Conway (2003) and Mankayi (2006) but this has been in the South African 
Defence Force (SADF) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
respectively. None of the research has directly explored constructions of masculinity in the 
context of the ANC military wing Umkhonto weSizwe. This study attempts to make a 
contribution to the understanding of masculinity as a social construct that shifts and changes 
depending on the context of its construction. 
2.2 Conceptual framework 
Broadly the study is theoretically framed by social constructionism. This is to say that the 
study holds the view that one is not born a man; men participate in social life as gendered 
beings where their masculinities are constructed within a social and historical context 
(Kimmel & Messner, 1998). Goffman's (1971) dramaturgical model has merit in this study. 
In this frame persons are seen as 'doing' masculinity rather than it being done on them or 
happening to them. Masculinity is therefore, to be achieved or worked at and although it is 
still socially constructed, the work of construction is not of causal powers attributed to some 
structure. The construction of masculinities is contingent and occasioned by a structure, 
process, candidates or discourse but the construction is accomplished by individuals as agents 
within a particular structure, time and space (Coleman, 1990). The shortcoming of Goffman's 
model, notes Coleman, is that it makes people out to be actors who are continuously and self-
consciously pursuing strategies of impression management. 
To counter this shortcoming, Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of 'habitus' and 'field' are useful. 
The concept of field requires recognition of the centrality of social relations to social 
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analysis. A field is "a structured system of social positions - occupied by individuals or 
institutions - the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants." (Jenkins, 1992, p. 
85). A field is simultaneously a system of forces between occupied positions that are 
internally structured by power relations such that there are positions of domination, 
subordination and and/or equivalence (Jenkins, 1992). Lastly, fields are defined by the stakes 
that are at stake in the field such as housing, education, lifestyle, employment, politics, social 
class and so forth (Jenkins, 1992). 
For the purposes of this work various fields can be delineated. First, there is the oppressive 
field of the apartheid state that can be taken to have been the dominant field of power in 
South African society. It is in relation to this field that the resistance field of the ANC and its 
allies existed which was, among other institutions, constituted by Congress of South African 
Students (CaSAS), Amabutho, the ANC underground and MK. Central to this study, a field 
of gender relations (that includes relations among men) must be added in which power 
relations are at play that produce positions of domination and subordination. 
Habitus, on the other hand, is a device that attempts to overcome the opposition between 
subjectivism and objectivism. Literally, the word is Latin and refers to a habitual/typical 
condition, state of appearance, particularly of the body (Jenkins, 1992). Habitus is "an 
acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in 
which it is constituted." (Jenkins, 1992, p. 74). 
Bourdieu retains the relationship between habitus and the body inherent in the concept's 
original meaning. Dispositions and generative classificatory schemes that are the essence of 
habitus are embodied in real human beings (Jenkins, 1992). Disposition is used by Bourdieu 
to include the spectrum of cognitive and affective factors such as thinking and feeling. There 
exists a relationship between habitus and the human body where habitus is embodied in 
human beings (Jenkins, 1992). 
This embodiment can happen in the following ways: (a) the habitus exists insofar as it is 
inside the heads of actors; (b) the habitus exists in, through and because of the practices of 
actors and their interaction with each other and the rest of their environment: ways of talking, 
moving, and doing things etc. (Jenkins, 1992). In this way the habitus is not just manifest in 
behaviour, it is an integral part of it. Although habitus is embodied in actors it is a social 
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phenomenon. There must therefore, be a distinction between habitus as embodied in 
individuals and habitus as a collective, homogenous phenomenon adjusted for and by social 
groups or classes. 
For this study habitus can, in the first instance, be understood to have been acquired by the 
respondents through experience and explicit socialisation (Jenkins, 1992); the lived 
experience under the apartheid regime; subsequent political involvement and politicisation. 
Following from this, the respondents' life and subsequent experience can be taken to have 
been a process of adjustment between subjectivity (the embodied habitus/socialised 
subjectivity) and objective reality (of oppression, military life and post-liberation South 
Africa). 
Secondly, habitus is a shared body of dispositions and classificatory categories that is the 
outcome of collective history; it is a product of history that produces individual and collective 
practices in accordance with the schemes generated by history (Jenkins, 1992). For this work, 
this is to say that habitus was the collective and shared understanding, by oppressed people, 
of the world that was engineered by apartheid ideologies. Finally then, the embodiment of 
habitus by individuals and collectives is an embodiment of a history which they are part of 
and it is in the context of this history that human action is generated that produces a range of 
probabilities allowed and constrained by that very history (Jenkins, 1992). For Bourdieu and 
Wacquant the relation then between field and habitus is twofold. First, it is a "relation of 
conditioning where the field structures habitus" (1992, p. 127). Second, it is a "relation of 
knowledge in which habitus contributes to making the field a meaningful world worth 
investing in" (ibid.). 
There are parallels between Bourdieu's concept of field and Connell's hegemonic 
masculinity framework that infonns the way that this study conceptualises masculinity. 
Hegemonic masculinity is not a fixed character type that is everywhere and always the same. 
It is instead that masculinity that occupies a hegemonic position in a given arrangement of 
gender relations and is always contestable (Connell, 1995). This means that the relations that 
construct masculinity are dialectical and it is for this reason that acknowledgement of 
different types of masculinity ought not to be taken as fixed categories or alternative 
lifestyles. This relational approach provides a framework that shows the practices that 
construct and uphold patterns of masculinity, particularly in the current Western gender order 
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(Connell, 1995). The framework has two types of relationships-hegemony, 
domination/subordination and complicity on the one hand, marginalisation and authorisation 
on the other that hold between groups of men. Hegemony has been considered, subordination, 
complicity and marginalisation will be considered in tum. 
In contemporary European and American society, the most important case of hegemony 
would be the dominance of heterosexual men and the subordination of homosexual men. This 
relationship is more than the stigmatisation of homosexual men but involves an array of 
material practices (Connell, 1995). Although the most conspicuous, gay masculinity is not the 
only subordinated masculinity as there are also cases of heterosexual men and boys who are 
excluded from parameters of legitimacy, the process of which is marked by verbal abuse 
(Connell, 1995). 
Similar to nonnative definitions of masculinity, men who strictly uphold hegemonic 
masculinity practices may be quite small yet a majority of men benefit from the advantages 
of hegemonic masculinity and the overall subordination of women. Complicity is that 
relationship between those men who do not embody hegemonic masculinity but benefit from 
the hegemonic project without having to face the tensions of risks of spearheading the project 
(Connell, 1995). 
Connell notes that hegemony, subordination and complicity are relations internal to the 
gender order and that when other factors such as "class and race interplay with gender further 
relations between masculinities are formed" (1995, p. 80). For example, he notes that in a 
"white supremacist context, black masculinities playa symbolic role in the construction of 
white gender" (ibid.). This is what seems to have been at play in apartheid South Africa as 
much as it was in right-wing politics in the USA Connell (1995), where the fantasy of a black 
rapist played a role in the sexual politics of whites. Conversely, white hegemonic masculinity 
upheld institutional oppression and physical terror that framed the making of black 
masculinities in communities (Connell, 1995). Marginalisation therefore, refers to the 
relations between dominant and subordinated classes and/or ethnic groups and is relative to 
the "authorisation of hegemonic masculinity" (ibid., p. 80). Connell's hegemony framework 
for thinking about and theorising masculinities is adopted in this study for its relational 
approach that reveals the doings that construct patterns of masculinities. 
Both Kimmel (1994) and Connell (1995) provide definitions of masculinity that are in line 
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with Connell's relational framework. For Connell masculinity is "simultaneously a place in 
gender relations, the practices through which men and women engage that place in gender, 
and the effects of these practices in bodily experience, personality and culture" (1995, p. 71). 
Kimmel on the other hand sees masculinity as a "constantly changing collection of meanings 
that we construct through our relationship with ourselves, with others and, with the world. 
Manhood is neither static nor timeless, it is historical" (1994, p.l20). As a working definition 
the study adopts and reworks both such that in this study: 
Masculinity is a constantly changing collection of meanings that we construct through our 
practices in gender relations. The effects of these practices manifest in bodily experience, 
personality and culture such that masculinity is neither static nor timeless, but is historical. 
2.2.1 Research design 
The study is designed as a qualitative in-depth interview study adopting a narrative inquiry 
approach. Chase (2005) describes narrative inquiry "as a particular type of -subtype - of 
qualitative inquiry. Contemporary narrative inquiry can be characterised as an amalgam of 
interdisciplinary approaches, and analytic lenses, diverse disciplinary approaches, and both 
traditional and innovative methods- all revolving around an interest in biographical 
particulars as narrated by the one who lives them" (p. 6510). Narrative is adopted here for 
two reasons. First, narrative inquiry is sensitive to and interested in how to treat the 
interviewee as narrator both during and after the interview for researchers that collect data 
through in-depth narrative interviews (Chase, 2005). This is a matter that is important when 
working with former soldiers whose narratives may be sensitive, emotional and highly 
political. This is particularly true in South Africa, as much as it may be in other neighbouring 
countries, where former liberation soldiers were once heroes from the 1960s to the 1990s and 
yet in post-liberation South Afi"ica appear to be inconsequential civilians mostly living in 
poverty in a country governed by the political party that called them into soldiering. 
Secondly, narrative inquiry attends to five different analytical lenses which are all concerned 
with a thorough, sensitive and critical fashion of dealing with empirical material (Chase, 
2005). The sociological approach is adopted in this study. 
This approach is used by sociologists who are interested in "identity work" that individuals 
engage in as they construct themselves within specific organisational, institutional, discursive 
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and local cultural contexts. "A major conceptual touchstone in this sociological approach is 
the 'deprivatisation' of personal experience. This approach highlights the wide range of 
institutional and organisational settings-some more and some less coercive-that shape 'the 
selves we live by'. A person's movement across a variety of settings creates further 
constraints as well as a plethora of options for narrating the self in a post-modern world" 
(Chase, 2005, p. 659). This approach links particularly well with Bourdieu's concept of 
'field' and the fact that the study explores masculinities in different contexts and times. 
Lastly, the sociological approach attends to narratives as lived experience and is therefore, 
interested in the how as much as in what of storytelling. 
2.2.2 Central research question 
How were MK ex-combatants masculine identities constructed and reconstructed within 
changing contexts from their politicisation, in MK in exile and again in post-liberation South 
Africa? 
2.2.3 Theory questions 
1. How did the respondents' political lives begin? 
2. What were the resources (practical and discursive) utilised to construct combatant 
masculinities in MK? 
3. Were the respondents successfully demobilised and reintegrated into society on their 
return to South Africa? 
4. How did their militarised masculinities adapt in post-liberation South Africa? 
2.2.4 Sampling 
Non-probability purposive sampling was used in this study, meaning that respondents were 
chosen due to their experience as soldiers and now former soldiers and their willingness to be 
part of the research. The respondents were between the ages of 33 and 41 at the time of the 
interviews. Three of the respondents were unemployed, one was temporarily employed and 
two were doing an internship at the 'Direct Action Centre for Peace and Memory' which was 
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also their source of income. All respondents had dependents, the least being three dependents 
and most being five dependents. Only one respondent had completed matric and the rest were 
disrupted while they were either in standard 7 or standard 8. Lastly, the respondents were 
from Gugulethu, Khayelitsha and Nyanga. 
2.2.5 Data collection 
Semi-structured one-to-one in-depth interviews were conducted using an interview schedule 
(a list of questions to guide the interviews) and recorded using a Dictaphone. The first set of 
interviews was conducted between 24 July 2007 and 31 August 2007. The interviews were 
mostly conducted in my apartment with the exception of two that were conducted at the 
University of Cape Town. Two interviews were conducted with each of the six respondents. 
Three of the respondents had been MK soldiers in exile, two had trained as MK soldiers but 
worked in the ANC underground in South Africa and the last had been an SDU member. 
Although ten interviews were conducted only six were used for the study. This is because 
after conducting the interviews I realized that due to the limitations of a Masters Research 
study it would not be possible to use and integrate all the data material with its varied 
experiences between the exiles, the underground cadre and the SDU cadre 
2.2.6 Data analysis 
The following analytical lenses follow from the narrative inquiry approach discussed above. 
First, narrative researchers approach narrative (oral or written) as a distinct type of discourse 
that highlights the idiosyncrasy of human practice and events rather than common properties. 
Narrative is seen as retrospective meaning making; a way of understanding one's and other's 
actions; and of organising events into a meaningful whole (Chase, 2005). The merit of this 
lens is the attention it gives to individuals' unique behaviour and making of meaning. This 
idiosyncratic perspective was held during the interviews, the reading of transcripts and their 
interpretation as a way of acknowledging and retaining each respondent's lived experience. 
Second, narrative inquiry views narratives as both enabled and constrained by a host of social 
structures and circumstances. This lens ties a thread with Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus' as 
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a collective homogeneous phenomenon in that while recogmsmg that every narrative IS 
particular, it also attends to the similarities and differences across narratives (Chase, 2005). 
While the first lens concerns itself with the idiosyncrasies of each narrative this lens gives 
room to similarities and differences in respondents' experience that allowed me to take note 
of themes in individual narratives and across narratives. 
Third, narratives are also taken as verbal action, that is, when a person tells a story they are in 
fact constructing, shaping and performing the self, experience and reality. Salient in this lens 
is the narrator's voice that draws attention to how and what is being communicated as well as 
to the subject positionalities or social locations from which the narrators speaks (Chase, 
2005). This analytical lens required me to be constantly conscious that although the 
respondents spoke in the 'now' their narratives were drawn from a historical context. My 
questions were thus, designed in a way that immersed the respondents in that historical time 
frame memory mode, as it were. 
Fourth, is a lens that speaks to the researcher's interpretation and presentation of the 
narratives under study. Here the four lenses outlined above apply to the researcher as much as 
they do to the 'researched'. This means that researchers when interpreting and presenting 
their work also assume the position of narrator. "As narrators, then, researchers develop 
meaning out of, and some sense of order in, the material they studied, they develop their own 
voice(s) as they construct other's voices and realities; they narrate "results" in ways that are 
both enabled and constrained by the social resources and circumstances embedded in their 
disciplines, cultures, and historical moments, and they write or perform their work for 
particular audiences" (Chase, p. 657). Finally, Tesch's (1990) approach of qualitative data 
analysis was adopted and is presented here. 
2.2.7 Ethical considerations 
De Vos (1998) maintains that participants can be harmed physical and/or emotionally in 
research and that it is the responsibility of the researcher to protect the respondent from harm 
of whatever nature. Taking cognizance of the sensitive nature of the stories of ex -combatants 
during their time as soldiers and that retelling these stories might lead to emotional instability 
funds were set aside for psychological intervention should any of the respondents had felt the 
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need for it. Moreover respondents were made aware that retelling their stories might evoke 
emotional and painful memories. Care was also taken to ensure confidentiality and 
anonymity of the respondents during and after the research by using pseudonyms and not 
revealing confidential infonnation shared in interviews without the consent of the 
respondents. 
This chapter has outlined the research methods employed in the study. Goffman and Coleman 
(1990) provide the theoretical framework that holds the construction of masculinities to be 
contingent and occasioned by a structure, process and discourse but where the construction 
itself is achieved by individuals as agents in a structure, time and space. Bourdieu (1992) 
adds to this theoretical frame by positing that persons exist within confines of power relations 
be they a political or social system, the military or a democratic dispensation. Bourdieu 
(1992) also locates individuals in a historical frame and in fact sees individuals as agents who 
embody a particular history and interact with each other and the environments thus, 
producing a range of probabilities allowed and constrained by that very history. Connell's 
relational understanding and approach to the construction of masculinities was a logical fit 
that complemented Bourdieu's (1992) concepts. Finally, the chapter outlined the narrative 
analysis used in the study. 
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CHAPTER THREE: HISTO-POLITICAL CONTEXT: 
EDUCATION, POLITICS AND RESISTANCE 
We must strive to win the fight against the non- White in the classroom instead of losing it on 
the battlefield. Administrator of the Transvaal, 1961 in Johnson (1982). 
There is a large body ofliterature documenting the histories of resistance in South Africa 
against the oppressive forces of apartheid that have their origin in colonialism and 
imperialism. These histories include those ofthe African National Congress and its military 
wing Umkhonto weSizwe (See for example: Karis & Gerhart, 1977; Meli, 1988; Ellis & 
Sechaba, 1992; Lienberg et.al, 1994; Lodge, 1994; Jarvis-Shean, 2001; McKinley, 1997), the 
United Democratic Front and its student alliance caSAS (See for example: Seekings, 1993; 
Cobbet & Cohen, 1988) and the general suffering and dehumanisation of black people under 
colonial and apartheid rule (See for example: Bundy, 1979; Hamilton, Huntley, Alexander, 
Guiaraes, & James, 2001; Terreblanche, 2002; MacDonald, 2006). 
A review of these histories reveals the following: (a) that the colonial, imperial and apartheid 
ideologies were set to hold the majority of South Africans in perpetual servitude for their 
interests in economic, political, social, and religious institutions; (b) in the face of ever 
increasing injustices, dehumanisation, racial segregation, economic constraints, political 
repression, engineered poverty, over-crowding, poor education, health and a host of other 
denied human rights radical black opposition emerged after non-violent attempts failed 
dismally and (c) the radical opposition that emerged out of the ANC-UDF alliance of the 
1980's had its foundations in community struggles that marked 'popular revolts' or what 
became known as 'a people's war' that mobilised and organised around political, economic, 
social and educational issues. 
Focusing on education this chapter aims to set the histo-political context for the study. There 
are three reasons for this. First, the choice is informed by the fact that the respondents of this 
study began their political lives when they were school students in the 1980s. Second, 
although among many other political, economic and social issues for which the struggle for 
national liberation was waged, education from 1976 played a central role in the broader 
23 
struggle (Levin, 1991). Third, the education struggle, to a large extent, placed the youth (who 
may have been at school, university or not receiving education at the time) at the forefront of 
the forefront of the struggle. 
3.1 Education, politics and economics 
From the outset the British education system was designed to be an instrument of social 
control. Through the policy of deliberate "anglicisation" (p. 216) for the Afrikaners, in 1812 
an English system of free education was begun with English used as the language of 
instruction (Johnson, 1982). The result was a near extinction of Dutch as a medium of 
instruction in secondary schooling and consequently the Afrikaners viewed the English 
system to be working to their disadvantage and resisted it. For the Africans, the British, after 
1853, implemented a policy of "civilising" (ibid., p. 217). The government of the day 
directed resources to some 175 mission societies for the furthering of education for the poorer 
classes (Johnson, 1982). As a result of the liberal ideals of the time, most schools were mixed 
serving Coloureds, Whites and Blacks with no colour bar (Johnson, 1982). 
The discovery of diamonds in Kimberly in 1867 and gold in the Witwatersrand in 1886 
radically and permanently changed the political and economic configuration in the South 
African colonies (Johnson, 1982; Giliomee & Schlemmer, 1989). Economically, the 
discovery rapidly transformed South Africa from a rural agricultural country to an urbanising 
and industrialising economy. Politically, these economic changes brought about ethnic 
tensions that resulted in the institutionalisation of ethnic stratification (Johnson, 1982). 
Urbanisation and industrialisation of South Africa led not only to ruthless conflicts between 
the English and Afrikaners but also between Africans and whites. Job, wealth and economic 
opportunities were a source of struggle between whites and especially poor Afrikaners and 
Africans (Johnson, 1982). Soon a laborious opposition to the education of Africans ensued 
partly because of the view that "an uneducated man ... can be exploited as an economic 
asset" and in pert to protect poor whites (Wilson & Thompson (1975) in Johnson 1982, p. 
216). Education was used to prepare white children for exclusive access to the rewards of a 
new and wealthy society, on the one hand, and to limit African's ability to compete for these 
rewards, on the other. The Interdepartmental Committee on Native Education in 1936, after 
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finding a marked disparity between school standards of whites and Africans, concluded that 
"the education of the white child prepares him for life in a dominant society and the 
education of the black child for a subordinate society" (Wilson & Thompson (1975) m 
Johnson, 1982, p. 217). 
1948 marked the culmination of Afrikaner nationalism that saw the National Party (NP) take 
the seat of power in the political history of South Africa. Prior to this, the National Party had, 
for about nine to ten years, been conducting research on education. In February 1948, close to 
the General Elections, the study results were published as a manifesto for Christian National 
Education (CNE) (Johnson, 1982). According to Johnson (1982) while the focus of the 
document was Afrikaner education, it also considered the implications of CNE for the 
education of Africans (p. 218). He further notes that the English strongly objected to this 
"Afrikaner cultural imperialism" to no avail (ibid). After completing the centralisation of 
white education, CNE was rigorously pursued. African education in comparison was quicker 
to centralise given that Africans were relatively powerless. Shortly after the elections the NP 
appointed the Eiselen Commission to formulate a policy for African education (Johnson, 
1982). The strong objections to this policy made by Africans before the commission were 
ignored by the report. Subsequently, the Bantu Education Act of 1953 was passed. 
3.2 Education and apartheid 
Afrikaner rule was supported and guided by Afrikaner nationalist ideology (see Adam and 
Giliomee, 1979; Du Toit & Giliomee, 1983; Giliomee & Schlemmer, 1989; Thompson, 1985; 
Moodie, 1975) that laid claim to land and Afrikaner sovereignty to that land, on the one hand. 
On the other, relations between white and black South Africans were determined by apartheid 
as an operative ideology in ways that advanced Afrikaner rule (Giliomee & Schlemmer, 
1989).The structure and content of education reflected, supported and legitimated the 
apartheid stratification system and perpetuated the domination of the Afrikaners over 
Africans. In addition to being free, education for Afrikaans and English children was 
compulsory from age 7 to 16 or at receiving the school leaving certificate. Primary and 
secondary expenditure was shared by both provincial and central government in equal 
proportions (Johnson, 1982, p. 218). 
25 
In comparison, education for Africans was neither compulsory nor free. Overall, African 
education compared to white education was phenomenally poor, classes were overcrowded, 
teachers were inadequately trained and there was a chronic shortage of books and equipment 
(Johnson, 1982; Nkomo, 1990). Consequently, students who managed to progress through the 
system were inadequately prepared to break the cycle of their economic and social 
subordination (Johnson, 1982; Nkabinde 1997). 
3.3 Education and socialisation 
South African education by the nature of its content i.e. norms, values, myths, beliefs and 
ideology acted as an agent of social control that legitimated and entrenched segregation 
(Johnson, 1982). Johnson argues that at the heart of apartheid's ideology was the notion of a 
superior European civilisation. Although not always explicitly articulated, apartheid's 
cultural chauvinism presented Europe as the birthplace of mankind's most outstanding 
accomplishment. Furthermore, European descendents were taken to have special entitlement 
to the fruits of "their" civilisation. To the extent that both whites and Africans accepted the 
myths that supported apartheid they were integrated into its value system and became 
compliant with its aims (Johnson, 1982). 
Textbooks for white children, for example, carried messages such as: 
"It is actually not only the white South African's skin which is different from that of 
the non-white. The white stands at a higher level of civilisation and is more 
developed. The whites must so live, so learn, and so work that we do not sink to the 
level of civilisation of non-whites" (Robertson and Whitten, 1978 cited in Johnson, 
1982, p. 223). 
On the other hand teachers were urged to: 
"Deliberately emphasise the necessity for the two white "races" to stand together in 
order to meet the rising Bantu nationalism. A white consciousness should be 
inculcated, and children should realise that they are the bearers of Christian Western 
civilisation. The fight for self-preservation and the right of self-detennination of the 
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whites in South Africa is a special task of education" (Hunter, 1966 cited in Johnson, 
1982, p. 223). 
Finally, the apartheid education system had implications for self-image through its 
indoctrination of white students with the myth of European superiority while impressing a 
negative image on African students. Through this, was also promoted a psychological climate 
in which African resistance to domination was dulled (Johnson, 1982). 
3.4 The education struggle 
Christie (1985) notes that teachers were in fact the first to oppose Bantu Education whose 
immediate effect for them included working double sessions; an increase in classroom size; 
no improvement on salaries and that they would be government employees (p. 226). It was on 
this backdrop, Christie asserts, that the ANC, in 1954 launched a 'Resist Apartheid 
Campaign' in which Bantu Education was among but not central in the six issues: the Group 
Areas Act, pass laws, the Native Resettlement Act, the Suppression of Communism Act and 
the anti-trade union measures covered by the campaign (p. 227). Unable to attend to all six 
matters the ANC delegated the Bantu Education issue to the Women's League and the 
Congress Youth League and from which came a school boycott. The boycott went ahead and 
the government responded by saying that it would expel any student who were not at school 
by 25 April; the boycott came to an end (Christie, 1985). 
In 1959 apartheid was extended to universities with the Extension of University Education 
Act being passed in that year. Christie notes that Fort Hare was to only register Xhosa 
students and two new 'tribally-based' university colleges were established- the University 
College of Zululand at Ngoye for Zulu speakers; the University College of the North at 
Turfloop for the Sotho, Tswana, and Venda people. The University College of the Western 
Cape was designated for Coloured people and Indians to the University College of Durban 
Westville (p. 231-232). These measures were mainly symbolically resisted by, for example, 
the University of the Witwatersrand and University of Cape Town declaring a commitment to 
be 'open universities' and holding 'academic freedom' lectures each year (Christie, 1985, p. 
232). 
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Beyond the education struggle the 1960s saw the climax of the ANC and Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC) rivalry that culminated in the Sharpville massacre. For this history see (Meli, 
1988; Jarvis-Shean, 2001; Karis and Gerhart, 1977; Lodge, 1994). After a series of boycotts 
and strikes that followed the Sharpville massacre the government responded fiercely once 
again and by 8 April the National Party declared both the ANC and PAC to be unlawful 
organisations (Lodge, 1994). 
3.5 Black Consciousness and youth politicisation 
After the ban the 1960s became relatively quiet years in tenns of general resistance to 
apartheid but there continued to be unrest in schools across the country. Strikes and boycotts 
continued and so did reports of students being punished or expelled from school for being 
insubordinate and for misconduct (Christie, 1985). The political tip-toeing of the 1960s ended 
with the establishment in 1969 of the university-based South African Students Organisation 
(SASO) and a new political force- Black Consciousness (BC). BC advocated for a rejection 
of white liberal supervision and support, the assertion of a black cultural identity, the 
psychological liberation from chains of inferiority and solidarity of all people of colour. BC, 
although organizationally weak, its ideological content appealed to "urban youth feeding in 
the frustration and deprivation they experienced and providing an alternative" (Hyslop, 1988, 
p.185). The BC slogan 'Black man, you are on your own' seems to have resonated with the 
student's frustrations (Christie, 1985). 
The ideological content of BC was important in providing a new political awareness that was 
heightened by other internal and external factors that gave the impression that the apartheid 
project was isolated and therefore, could be challenged (Hyslop, 1988). BC incorporated in 
its philosophy a range of views but chiefly stood for the rejection of white domination in all 
its political, economic, psychological and cultural fonns (Christie, 1985; Ranuga, 1986). 
Hook (2004) maintains that, like Frantz Fanon (1968) Steve Biko (1978) too stressed the 
salience of a "healthy subjectivity, of a robust, proud and positive self-image as crucial both 
in creating of solidarity amongst the oppressed and in empowering one's self to resist 
oppression (p. 104). 
Political conscientisation was for Biko the key strategy for Black Consciousness. 
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Conscientisation included 'protest talk', the talk about the circumstances of oppression. Biko 
in his own words: 'We try to get the Black man in conscientisation to grapple realistically 
with their problems ... to develop what one might call an awareness, a physical awareness of 
their situation ... to be able to analyze it, and to provide answers for themselves.' (Hook, 2004, 
p. 105-106). BC called for solidarity among all black people irrespective of social, political 
and economic differences and was very influential in the resistance that continued on 
campuses and schools (Christie, 1982). By 1976 the political conjucture, the structural 
reorganization of the education and changes within the political culture of urban black youth 
combined to give rise to a critical situation (Hyslop, 1988, p. 186). The spark and last straw 
was provided by the education department's insistence of the use of Afrikaans as a medium 
of instruction as a manoeuvre to reassert Afrikaner cultural priorities. The history of the 
Soweto uprising that resulted in a nationwide revolt is well recorded and will not be dealt 
with here. See for example (Brink et al., 2006; Hlongwane, Ndlovu and Mutloatse, 2006; 
Magubane, 1986). 
3.6 Youth militancy 
The beginning of 1980s saw a renewed senes of boycotts when school students from 
Coloured and African schools together with black student from five campuses, a total of 
approximately one hundred thousand students boycotted classes from April 1980 to January 
1981. The boycott was over what had been a continuous deterioration of education conditions 
but soon embodied wider political issues and this marked the beginning of the dominant role 
that students would play (Hyslop, 1988; Mufson, 1991). Hyslop (1988) holds the view that 
the signature of the 1984 students was that through CaSAS they had a real national 
organisation that could call for action at a national level (p. 192). This made it possible for 
caSAS to have, by 1984, a well structured organisation with branches with approximately 
fifty centres mainly in the Eastern Cape and Southern Transvaal (Mufson, 1991). 
The strategy of caSAS leadership was that they used 'short-term' demands on education as 
a basis for mobilizing students and then using the level of organisation as a platform for 
action on national political issues (Hyslop, 1988; Lodge, 1991). That said the degree of 
organisation in CaSAS should not be given too much weight. caSAS was a mass movement 
insofar as scores of students responded to its calls rather than a leadership fraction organized 
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into structures with regular and disciplined activities (Hyslop, 1988). 
In August of 1984 the state held elections for the Coloured and Indian tricameral parliament. 
Seeing these as dummy institutions and rejecting them on that basis, CaSAS and the 
National Forum (NF) called for boycotts as a strategy of protesting the elections. CaSAS 
subsequently began to gain momentum nationally as the number of schools participating in 
boycotts increased. (Hyslop, 1988). 
This increase in momentum propelled community, trade UnIons and political leaders to 
express solidarity with the students. A successful stay-away was staged in the East Rand in 
support of school students 'demands' that provided the platform for the boycott (Hyslop, 
1988). Another boycott, the Southern Transvaal stay-away was launched in support of 
student's demands on Students Representative Councils (SRCs), an end to age limits but also 
wider economic demands such as an end to rent and bus fare increases. The student worker 
solidarity that was consciously organized was an inroad for the student movement (Hyslop, 
1988). The interplay between the education struggles with the broader political struggle 
brought school student, university students and youth who were out of school into more 
clashes with the police. Although they were mainly at the receiving end of state violence, the 
youth of the 1980s were also agents of collective violence. 
Struggling against oppression and responding to repression the youth engaged in acts of 
violence as perceived means of bringing about social justice (Marks, 2001). Political 
violence of a particular kind McKendrick & Hoffman called 'revolutionary violence' 
suggested that violence was in most instances directed at the state, its property, personnel and 
allies (1990, p.470). This 'revolutionary violence' which often included killing was carried 
out heeding the ANC's call for ungovernability (Marks, 2001). Seekings (1993) is of the view 
that in fact the ANC at this time "encouraged almost any form of militancy as contributing to 
the intensification of a 'people's war' against the state where the youth were the heroic 
combatants" (p.97) Take as an example, Oliver Tambo's speech in 1985 at a Kwabwe 
Conference: 
" ... the battles are raging in our country. The war of liberation continues and it is intensifying 
with each passing day. The time has come for us to acquire weapons to pay the minority 
regime back with its own coin. We cannot die alone. We cannot bury alone ... We must 
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respond to the reactionary violence of the enemy with our revolutionary violence" (Marks, 
2001, p. 89). 
In the first instance then, youth comrades saw themselves as 'home defenders' and thus 
conceived of their violence as being counter-violence in the face of obvious state violence 
(Sitas, 1992). Their role as warriors (Marks, 2001) was given more salience than that of 
school students because of warlike activities that unfolded in the streets. Sitas continues to 
say that the youth as comrades "obeyed codes of a 'metaphor': they are 'soldiers of the 
liberation movement' and a militarisation of their subculture is endemic to any of their 
gatherings- military and militant songs, gestures, artificial (but increasingly real) guns, 
rhythm, khaki attire: they see themselves as the movement's combatants unto death" (1992, 
p.635). Their song compositions depicted the self as hero, liberator, and MK cadre crossing 
the border and back and shooting and fighting (ibid.). 
3.7 Conclusion 
The chapter has been concerned with outlining the histo-political context with a focus on 
education. In this way the chapter has shown that from the beginning of the colonial project 
right through to apartheid, education was used as instrument for white advancement and a 
weapon for black domination, the residue of which still has real effects for many South 
African today. In setting the context for the study, the chapter locates the issues explored in 
the following chapters in history as well as the respondents firstly as youth and school 
students, as MK recruits and liberation soldiers and finally as returned soldiers. The 
following chapter focuses on the respondents as youth and their politicisation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: YOUTH POLITICISATION 
In the 1980s when the respondents of this research were politically active school students the 
ANC was still banned therefore, making its political activities take the form of underground 
work. The respondents were involved in the ANC underground, and the Congress of South 
African (CaSAS) and Amabutho which were not banned. The respondents political work 
can thus, be said to have been publicly undertaken and concealed; legal and illegal. 
Suttner (2008) points out that underground political work by its nature and organization is 
very different from other fonns of political practice. Given that operatives working 
underground often did so in very difficult circumstances their survival under these conditions 
required that they know very well the reasons for their sacrifice. In other words, Suttner 
maintains, underground work required a degree of political consciousness and political 
maturity. He further points out that those who were in command structures were expected to 
possess and demonstrate high level of discipline, in-depth political understanding and a 
willingness to sacrifice, a capacity to mobilize and conduct political activity, to train and 
deal with the unexpected. That said, within the underground units, professionalism varied 
depending on level, character and effectiveness of training and group cohesion with its 
command structures or 'handlers'. Nevertheless, advice of mature cadres often served as 
effectively as training courses for young and/or inexperienced operatives (Suttner, 2008, p. 
92). Lastly, there existed hierarchical structures in the underground that were necessitated by 
the fact that the bulk of underground activities were military or quasi-military in nature 
(Suttner, 2008). 
The main concern of this chapter is to explore how the respondents of this research came to 
political consciousness within the context of the liberation struggle. The chapter begins with a 
look at the concept of youth as it was understood in the 1980s, a time when the respondents 
were youth and school students. 
The chapter then looks at the ways in which state violence both in the private and public 
sphere impacted on the respondents. It is these experiences that appear to have propelled the 
respondents toward political involvement. The chapter then follows the respondents through 
various interconnected political structures (CaSAS, Amabutho and the ANC underground) 
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that set off particular processes of politicisation. Finally, an attempt is made to point out the 
interrelations between the respondents' politicisation and a masculinity discourse. 
4.1 The youth 
There is an accentuated importance of the 'youth' in most accounts of South African 
resistance politics of the 1980s and yet agreement as to who or what this category constituted 
is hard to find. Some of the reasons for this lack of agreement include: a limited number of 
studies on 'youth politics', youth organisations, action and attitudes, conceptual confusion 
and ambiguity (Seekings, 1993, p. xi). Furthermore, Seekings notes that in South Africa the 
youth category was not a sociological or demographic construct but a political one. Among 
other conditions, being young and politically active was seen as necessary for inclusion in the 
youth category. Moreover, the category of youth was almost exclusively used to refer to 
young African people with the occasional inclusion of Coloured and Indian people. The use 
of the term to refer to young white South Africans was a rare exception (Seekings, 1993). 
South Africa had white teenagers and black youth. "Teenager is a term devoid of political 
meaning; youth is laden with it" (Seekings, 1993, p. xii). Given that the category of youth 
was a political construct it makes no sense to speak of 'youth politics'. "There is no such 
thing as 'youth politics' in terms of a discrete, let alone homogeneous, sociological category 
of people which thinks, organizes and acts, politically, in specific and distinctive ways" 
(Seekings, 1993, p.xiv). Therefore, 'youth politics' is used in this study, as Seekings does in 
his, in a 'general descriptive sense' (ibid.) and the analysis of which should examine the basis 
of the construction of the category 'youth' and for the purposes of this work, the comrade 
identity which the respondents of this research strongly identified with. 
4.2 Two stereotypes of the youth 
In the 1980s the youth was widely depicted in two contrasting ways. On the one hand the 
youth were presented as politicized and militant therefore, viewing the youth in sympathetic 
terms. On the other hand the youth was portrayed as destructive and rebellious and thus, 
hostile (Sitas, 1992; Seekings, 1993). These stereotypes characterized the youth in relation to 
particular types of behaviour, motivations and effects (Seekings, 1993). 
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4.3 'Youth as apocalypse' 
The stereotype of "youth as apocalypse" (Seekings, 1993) portrayed youth as "rebels against 
social and political order and associated with violence and destruction" (ibid., p.2-3). Sitas 
cited in Seekings (1993) writing about the same stereotype and its elements of militancy and 
violence that was feared to be over spilling into crime and gangsterism with respect to the 
. comrades' : 
"The tyre, the petrol-bomb, the knife, the stone, the hacking: death. The words 
'comrade' and 'amaqabane' conjure them up ... the word [comrade] frames images of 
unemployed black youth with no future, no home, busy destroying everything in their 
way: homes, shops, schools, infrastructures and traditions ... [T] he media picture is of 
young men, with hardened features and red eyes ... " (1991, p. 3). 
Here the youth were not only associated with violence, violence itself was broadly 
understood in terms of the youth. Furthermore, this presentation of youth in the media 
combined (a) racist imageries of African idleness and savagery that was so feared by white 
South Africans with (b) the western tradition of urban male criminality and fears of 
generational rebellion (Seekings, 1993). 
4.4 'Youth as Young Lions' 
In contrast the liberatory view focused on the "political commitment of the youth and their 
contribution in the struggle for justice and liberation" (Seekings, 1993, p. 2). In this view the 
youth were shown as altruistic and purposeful rebels that were spearheading the liberation 
struggle, they were politicised rather than inadequately socialised and were for, and within 
rather than against, the community (Seekings, 1993). In this view the youth were extolled as 
'young lions' and accordingly urged to 'roar'. The ANC for example, in 1987 called for the 
youth to "act as the yeast, to energise and dynamise the people as a whole" (Seekings, 1993, 
p. 6), in fact the role of the youth in township struggles was seen as being similar to that of 
Umkhonto weSizwe in the ANC. 
In line with this view of the youth, young people saw themselves as 'comrades' who were 
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fighting for the liberation of South Africa. Most comrades were young (below 35), most were 
from embattled working-class households, most were unemployed and most of their cultural 
codes were developed outside their households and kinships. Notwithstanding, among the 
phenomenon called 'comrades' were university graduates, full wages-earners, political 
activist, school students, shop-stewards, petty criminals and lumpen proletarians(Sitas, 1992, 
p. 629-630). 
4.5 State violence: A point of departure 
The pervasiveness of state violence infiltrated both the public and private spheres of black 
people's lives physically, emotionally and psychologically on a daily basis. For some 
respondents it was the experience of state violence in the private sphere that evoked an urge 
to partake in political activity. 
"I too wanted to be part and parcel of the struggle and especially when a scene 
happened in front of me. When one of my parents, my father, he was in fact involved 
in struggle activities, you see ... the Boers found out about that and there was a raid 
and they raided at night and they beat him in front of me. They beat him in front of 
me and 1 realized that this thing is now on my door step" (Vukani). 
There is a sense of disbelief and helplessness in Vukani that the incident happened which is 
suggested by the repeated utterance of 'in front of me'. This utterance also subtly creates an 
image of an oppressive government whose might and violent tactics were hard to escape as 
they permeated the everyday life experience of black communities. As a consequence of 
witnessing the 'scene' he expresses a deliberate and conscious wanting to get involved in the 
struggle now that 'this thing' which he will not name therefore, giving the incident a sense of 
vagueness was 'now on his door step'. Unlike those times when he witnessed and heard of 
state violence in the public sphere this incident it seems was the ultimatum that decided his 
political involvement. 
With continued political involvement some respondents experienced some form of 
victimisation at the hands of the security forces. Here a respondent describes an incident 
where he was man-handled by police during a community campaign to disregard counsellors 
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that were seen to be collaborating with the apartheid state: 
"So they started hitting me and my friend escaped before they caught him ... it left a 
mark on my body and I still have it even now, you see. When I went back home the 
police frequently came looking for me. I did not like that because if the police keep on 
coming to my house it was going to give another impression in the township and so I 
tried to run away from them" (Philani). 
There are a few noteworthy points here. The first is a remark on the fashion in which Philani 
narrated this part of his story. When he spoke of the security police beating him he did so 
with a somewhat detached voice and feeling. Yet there was a sense of pride and deeper 
meaning attached to the experience he was recalling. Second, is the fact that he was assaulted. 
He spoke of this again, with a sense of pride as though the beating affirmed his involvement 
in the struggle. It was a record of his involvement, his commitment to the liberation of his 
community and South Africa and he could still point to bodily scars as a reminder of the 
reality of the past, the struggle and his part in it. Altogether the quote reveals that political 
involvement sometimes had dangerous and immediate consequences and still a sense of pride 
and dignity was derived from political involvement. 
4.6 Politicisation processes 
Respondents of this research were involved in politics and mainly student politics with 
CaSAS membership being common among all respondents. Another avenue of political 
activity was what was known as Amabutho 'Warriors' (an underground para-military 
structure that according to the respondents preceded the well known self defence units) that 
were not necessarily affiliated with the ANC but were at various times used by the ANC 
underground structures in numerous operations. Consider the respondents remarks on their 
involvement in both caSAS and Amabutho. 
" ... take for instance CaSAS, I was heavily involved in CaSAS because I was a 
student then and secondly, politics did not end at school they also went into the 
community. In the community there were these structures called Amabutho and there 
were activities that happened and when we went to school the following day those 
activities continued" (Thabani). 
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"Even when our leadership of the underground structures came we would take them 
from one point .... that is when I was a schoolboy and the Boers could not suspect me 
because I was a schoolboy and I would wear my school uniform and walk with this 
elderly man as ifhe was my father" (Vukani). 
There is an impression that Thabani's involvement in politics was by necessity and thus, less 
of a choice. It was his role and identity as a school student that necessitated his involvement 
together with the free flowing nature of politics between school and community. Both at 
school and in the community his political activities appear to occur within the organisational 
parameters of caSAS and Amabutho respectively. It is this continuity of political life and 
activity between school and community that made it possible for Vukani to escort 
underground leadership. This was an underground political activity that was undertaken in 
the public eye yet remained concealed. In the context of 'commu-school politics' Vukani 
seems to have been transformed into a 'political soldier' and his school uniform into an 
appropriate camouflage. 
4.6.1 From Amabutho to the ANC underground 
Here Vukani suggests a connection between Amabutho and the ANC. 
"So I too became part and parcel and I joined the ANC first because you could not 
join MK without being an ANC member first. You had to be known before you joined 
MK and so I worked for the underground structures which were called 
Amabutho ... and basically politically active at that time and that's whereby I joined" 
(Vukani). 
Vukani's nalTative is suggestive of an implicit method of recruitment that that made ANC 
membership not an easily attainable badge. When Vukani says 'You had to be known before 
you joined ... ' the question must then be asked: known for what? It might be readily apparent 
that it was for his political activities that Vukani had to be known for and he therefore, 
worked for Amabutho. In these activities he was earning his 'political credentials'. 
When asked if they were influenced to join the ANC Vukani and Thabani reported that: 
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" ... there was a person like that, he was my commando ... but even then I had taken the 
decision to stand up and say today I am going to try and make contacts" (Vukani). 
"Actually I did not join the ANC because I was born into the struggle, you 
understand. There was no one telling us to join because the ANC had opened its ranks 
to the youth of South Africa" (Thabani). 
The commando that Vukani is referring to here would likely have been a member of the ANC 
underground. It is to him that Vukani had to demonstrate his political activities. There seems 
to have existed a relationship between the youth as 'lions' and ANC cadres who would have 
been older and politically more mature than the school students (in the case of this study). It 
was thus, under the gaze of these older men that Vukani had to be known and prove himself 
worthy of ANC membership. This makes it clear not only for what but also to whom that the 
respondents had to be known. 
On the other hand, for Thabani ANC membership was not something that he had to seek 
because he was 'born into the struggle' and was by default a member of the ANC. It seems 
that from the time that respondents began political work and especially in their operations 
with the ANC underground there was pressure to demonstrate and prove themselves. These 
acts of proving and demonstrating loyalty and trust, and the pressure to be known and seen by 
older men seem to have increased on joining the ANC. 
4.6.2 UmKhonto weSizwe recruitment 
Once ANC membership had been achieved the next step was to maintain it. Loyalty to the 
ANC and commitment to the struggle appear to have continued to be salient determining 
factors for selecting MK recruits. Take for example: 
"So you had to be active and be loyal and prove to the organization that you are 
working for it and that is whereby you would be given a channel. I was loyal to the 
organization and they decided that this comrade must move from here to there ... " 
(Philani). 
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"Loyalty was important and trust, whether you were trustworthy and they also 
checked your operations, whether you do them on time ... Those are the things that 
they check the most" (Vukani). 
Suttner's (2008) work and the respondents' narratives give strong indications that the ANC 
underground was predominantly constituted of male cadres. Political activities, loyalty and 
trustworthiness in effect had to be demonstrated not to an abstract organisation but to an 
organisation of men. Perhaps not in its entirety but the ANC underground appears to have set 
itself up intentionally or not as a homosocial enactment of some sort. Joining the ANC then 
seems to have been not that different to undergoing a rite of passage and a political initiation 
into manhood. 
It might be necessary to animate what seems to have been going on in underground political 
practice: On being agitated by various incidents the respondents undertook political work and 
consequently travelled what might have been both a political and deeply personal journey 
through their activities in CaSAS and Amabutho. By coming to the ANC they now stood at 
the gates of an organisation that was predominantly male and were now under a very 
particular masculine gaze. Using that male preserve currency of political work they had to 
demonstrate loyalty, trustworthiness, commitment and determination to be allowed entry into 
the ANC and in tum MK. 
The respondents however, were not passively acted upon by others. They too appear to have 
been active in their own politicisation and had no illusions about the salience of political 
understanding as Vukani and Philani show: 
"Y ou first have to know politics before you do anything, before you join the army and 
know why you are joining the army, what are the things that have led you to join the 
army" (Vukani) 
"I am not going to say they were looking for something specific but it was your 
political understanding that made you enthusiastic to become an MK cadre" (Philani). 
What these narratives suggest is that political understanding was deemed paramount if one 
was intending to join the armed struggle. In tum political understanding also seems to have 
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been an energlzmg agent and motivating factor to join MK therefore, suggesting a link 
between politics and the military. In fact Kasrils put it clearly when he said "our combatants 
and organizers - must be imbued with political theories and ideas, must understand that 
politics guides the gun and gives the motivation and courage for a successful struggle" (1988, 
p. 1). 
4.6.3 'Skipping' the country 
"So you see this thing of skipping ... people are skipping, where are they skipping to? 
So okay, I heard that there was such and such a place and then the soccer club 
secretary, I am sure he was in the ANC underground structures because it was he who 
told me what to do" (Philani). 
Leaving for exile was a phenomenon better known as 'skipping' the country. Philani suggests 
that there were no individuals who held exclusive rights in a particular office and authorised 
the' skipping' out of the country of MK recruits. This among other things might have been as 
a result of the secrecy of underground political work and the threat of infiltration from state 
agents: 
"In operations you found that there were enemIes who pretended to be 
comrades ... they worked with us and they worked with the enemy and you found that 
sometimes information leaked" (Vukani). 
Instead what seems to have happened is that: 
" ... there were people around the community who could check on you and recommend 
you to a contact and after that you go join MK" (Thabani). 
"Although you did not know that but there were people, commanders who were 
responsible for taking you from point A to point B" (Vukani). 
It appears then that the recommendation, recruitment and affirmation of possible MK recruits 
involved other community members who perhaps would have been members of the ANC 
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underground but not necessarily commanders in the underground structures. This is important 
to note particularly in light of an earlier claim that it was older men who affirmed younger 
men and gave them access into the ANC and in tum MK. Things may not have necessarily 
happened in the neat fashion that has been portrayed. It is highly probable that women might 
have played a role in recruiting for MK because they too would have been comrades in the 
ANC underground. 
4.6.4 Motivations for joining MK 
Not all who were politicised joined MK in exile and so the question of motivation for joining 
MK in exile was worth asking. 
"I joined the liberation struggle to free my country and my people and my family in 
order to be recognized and to bring back our dignity because in the past we had no 
dignity as all so those are the things that made me join the anned forces" (Thabani). 
"Most of us joined Umkhonto because we wanted to liberate the country" (Philani). 
" ... the reason we left is because of the operations we were doing and no one wanted 
to be caught and when an opportunity to run away into exile presented itself you 
left ... " (Vukani). 
It is clear that the joining of MK was motivated in the first instance by a strong urge for the 
liberation of South Africa. Thabani is clear that for him joining the armed struggle was to 
fight the oppressors and liberate the nation and restore the dignity that had been lost. For 
Vukani going into exile was a logical alternative than the risk of being captured by the 
security forces for his political operations. When asked if they wanted to be soldiers, 
respondents reported that: 
"No, I did not want to be a soldier" (Philani). 
"Being a soldier is something that happened on its own with time because as a young 
child of ten, eleven and you see Boers shooting at us with tear gas and rubber bullets 
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and we fight back with stones" (Thabani). 
"No, not because I wanted to be a soldier. After liberation we thought that we were 
going to be asked the question whether there were those who wanted to go back to 
school and those who wanted to continue serving the anny" (Vukani). 
There appears to be an inconsistency in logic here between wanting to fight for liberation and 
not wanting to be soldiers. Alternatively, the problem could be the question. That is, because 
the question was asked in hindsight it could be that the respondents answered it on the basis 
of their soldiering experience that leads them to conclude that they did not want to be 
soldiers. This is different from saying that at the time of being recruited into MK that they 
were categorically against the idea of being soldiers. Still it might be that they did not want to 
be soldiers but nevertheless joined MK for the liberation cause. What Vukani suggests is that 
soldiering was for him and perhaps others a temporary inconvenience as a means to liberation 
which post 1994 he thought was going to be addressed by being offered an opportunity for 
education. 
4.7 Pulling it together: resistance politics and masculinist discourse 
Suttner (2008) observes that "too often liberation struggles are defined by masculinist 
discourse and as an essentially male terrain where women enter periodically" (p. 105). How 
might we then understand the tendency that men have assumed political work to be their 
preserve such that (as in the case ofthis study) in the process ofpoliticization they would also 
graduate as a 'men'? Morrell (1998) and Suttner (2008) point out that in a colonial/apartheid 
context there was an actual attack on African manhood that was expressed, for example, 
when men were called boys irrespective of their age. 
African assertions of manhood (Suttner, 2008) should then be "understood not only as a 
challenge to a putative childlike status but as symbolising a wider rejection of overlordship" ... 
such that "the assertion of manhood is in this context a claim for freedom" (p. 108). Seen 
from this position the struggle for liberation had more to it than masculinist imagery; it was in 
essence a struggle for dignity and the reclaiming of the rights to be treated as an adult human 
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being (ibid., p. 112). What remains unexplained is why men undertook the duty to reject 
overlordship and lay claim to freedom in such a way that their sense of manhood took 
exclusive priority in this project? 
The importance placed on manhood appears to be linked to a historical tradition that ties the 
struggle for freedom to heroic projects of previous generations that resisted conquest and 
oppression. In addition to Bambatha, Makhanda is another figure that was invoked and posed 
as a model for activists and MK fighters. Makhanda is a legendary figure in the early 
resistance to British conquest who in 1819 led an unsuccessful attack on the Grahamstown 
garrison and was imprisoned in Robben Island. He in fact surrendered to save his people from 
further loss of life and died while trying to escape from Robben Island (Suttner, 2007). This 
discourse seems to have established the male as a warrior and hero in ANC self-identity 
located in a particular place and time in the continuing tradition of martial heroism and 
resistance. It is not surprising then that joining the ANC and/or MK was at times associated 
with the attainment of manhood or undertaking rites of passage (Suttner, 2008). 
Notwithstanding the varied nature of masculinities in the struggle it is clear that the hero was 
held to be essentially male. Given that some aspects of the liberation struggle involved 
dangerous activities that called for acts of heroism; these activities were taken to be primarily 
men's work. Unterhalter (2000) in her analysis of autobiographies of people who undertook 
heroic projects shows that these people saw their activities in the struggle as 'real work' 
which was different from conventional work to earn money. This concept of work was 
however, not "applied to work in the home; all work, including heroic work which was the 
prerogative of the male" (Suttner, 2008, p. 116). 
In light of this, the importance to be known and seen doing political activities had its place 
beyond initiation into the ANC. Being politically active placed the respondents in what was a 
continuation of a long history of resistance from conquest and oppression. This was a historic 
tradition that had been championed by heroic male warriors and the continuation of which 
had to be spearheaded by men who emulated similar qualities as their predecessors. 
At first glance it appears that the marriage between politics and manhood gave way to an 
assertion of manhood that served as a means through which claims to dignity, liberation from 
trusteeship and right to be treated as adult human beings could be made. However, another 
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way that we could see this is to say that a nation of assaulted and wounded manhood sought 
to redeem itself through political work. This manhood drew its strength and imagery from 
histories such as that of Makhanda and Bambatha that were "expressed in a language of 
manhood, confirming a linkage between heroism and masculinity" (ibid., p. 117). In other 
words, by pursuing national liberation men in the ANC were also pursuing their own 
manhood agenda, their own liberation, dignity, and recognition that were being denied by 
other men who were spearheading the apartheid regime. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the first context in which the respondents' masculine identities were 
constructed, namely, apartheid South Africa. Apartheid's racial project denied black men 
their adulthood. It emasculated and infantilised them politically, racially, socially, and 
economically. In response the national liberation struggle married politics with masculinist 
imagery such that political involvement was laden with meanings of manhood. The 
institutions in which these meanings were made include CaSAS, Amabutho and the ANC. 
Furthermore, the ideological and political constructs that portrayed the youth in 1980s as 
'young lions', wan'iors, protectors of communities and freedom fighters were central in 
shaping the norms for being a man. And, the power relations between the respondents as 
youth, and ANC cadres who played the role of political mentors were central to the process 
of older men 'making' younger men. These men were not only gatekeepers to the ANC and 
MK but also to manhood. These power relations existed within the confines of liberation 
ideology and discourse that characterised the struggle against apartheid. 
The complex working of the processes and practices III this context constructed young 
masculinities that were politically conscious and active as well as militant. These men saw 
themselves as the young lions of the liberation struggle. Although they were loyal to the ANC 
they were not bound by an explicit code of conduct nor were they regimented or 
institutionalised. This politicised civilian struggle masculinity could in fact be seen as a 
masculinity of 'ungovernability' in the sense that the ANC called for 'ungovernability' and 
'people's power' in its 1985 conference. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: MILITARY TRAINING 
J wrote in m)' journal: "Perhaps the worst thing that can be said is that J am becoming a 
soldier. To be a soldier! That is at best to be something less than a man. To say nothing of 
being a philosopher. " Since then J have frequently wondered what it meant to be a "soldier" 
and why J regarded myse(f then, insofar as J was a soldier, as less than a man. Glenn Gray 
(1967). 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first explores respondents' experiences in 
transit and training camps prior to basic training. It reveals relations between respondents and 
the military as a foundation upon which the rest of their military life was based. The second 
section pays attention to and interrogates the training of the respondents as MK soldiers. 
In reading this chapter, it is important to keep in mind that some of the literature used is 
based on experiences and finding from conventional armies. The use of this literature, despite 
MK having been a guerrilla anny, is based on the conviction that this literature is useful 
insofar as we presuppose a "more or less universal" military life experience. Furthermore, 
this literature provides useful insights where literature on MK is minimal or simply non-
existent. Lastly, the terms 'respondent(s)' and 'recruits(s)' are used interchangeably in the 
first section and 'respondent(s)' and 'trainee(s) in the second section. 
5.1 The military institution 
Although the military is a part of society it in many ways still remains separate from it such 
that becoming a part of the military requires by necessity a separation of the individual 
physically and psychologically from his/her former social context (Spindler, 1948). Many 
young men are "lured, drafted and recruited into the military with the promise to tum them 
into men: 'Join the army, be a man'; 'The army will make a man of you' . These messages are 
in general coded with the belief that youth will return as 'men' " (Arkin & Dobrofsky, 1978, 
p. 154). Furthermore, Arkin and Dobrofsky note that the evidence for this belief is provided 
through recognition, jobs, education, medals and honours for those who have served, and so 
the message is reinforced that the military through its influence and discipline will 
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undoubtedly produce men (1978, p. 154). Acknowledgements such as these probably applied 
to conventional armies like the South African Defence Force whereas in MK no record them 
of exists. 
Joining the military is socially and personally viewed not only as an opportunity for boys to 
become men but also as the appropriate time for the military to make men of boys. Military 
secondary socialisation and "indoctrination happens at a time when society expects and 
requires the formation of adult sex-role identity" (ibid., p. 155). The military therefore, 
occupies a unique position in the spectrum of adult socialisation and more so when we 
consider that "many young men and women enter the military between the ages of 17 and 
20--a period of transition from adolescence to adulthood" (ibid., p. 151). If we accept the 
assertions made by Spindler (1948) and Arkin & Dobrofsky, (1978), we in tum might be 
interested in the nature of the military as an institution and Goff man's (1961) writing on 
asylums as institutions is useful in this regard. 
All institutions have encompassing tendencies; total institutions however, are symbolized by 
their barrier to the outside social world (Goffinan, 1961). What total institutions do is to 
rearrange the basic social arrangement of modem society in which the individual sleeps, 
plays and works in different places; with different co-participants and under different 
authorities and sometimes without an overall rational plan. 
The following central features of total institutions spelt out by Goffman strongly suggest that 
MK in exile could with some confidence be considered as a total institution. First, in a total 
institution life in its entirety is conducted in the same space and under the same single 
authority. Second, daily life and its activities are carried out in the immediate company of a 
larger group that the individual is part and with whom he does the same activities and receive 
a uniform treatment. Third, all daily activities are tightly scheduled such that one activity 
logically leads to another at a prearranged time, and with the whole sequence of activities 
being imposed through a hierarchical system of officials and fonnal rules. Fourth, all the 
various enforced activities are held together as "a single rational plan purportedly designed to 
fulfil the aims of the institution" (Goffman, 1961, p. 17). Finally, the handling of large groups 
of people and their human needs in a bureaucratic organization, irrespective of whether this is 
an effective or necessary means of social organization, is the key fact of total institutions. 
Consequently this allows for large bodies of people to be supervised by personnel whose 
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main task is not guidance or periodic inspection but surveillance. Whether it is the small 
supervisory personnel or the large group, who takes priority, is of little salience in a total 
institution more than that each is made for the other (ibid. p.l8). The concept of total 
institution is insightful in thinking about the military but it is used here with caution bearing 
in mind that Goffman was mainly writing about asylums and where he draws military 
experience it is from conventional annies. Therefore the concept of total institution cannot be 
wholly applied to MK. 
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SECTION 1 
5.2 The transit camp 
Once the respondents had left the country their first stop was at what were known as 'transit 
camps' (usually Lesotho in the experience of the respondents). In the transit camp recruits 
would spend weeks to months before proceeding to a 'training camp' (Angola, Uganda, and 
Tanzania). It was during this time in the transit camp that recruits experienced the formal 
beginning of the 'passage to soldiering' and by formal is meant that what the respondents 
encountered here were their initial experiences of military life that were different from their 
experiences in South Africa and in their involvement for example in Amabutho. 
5.2.1 Guns or books 
"Lesotho is a transit camp. It's whereby you have to be prepared, you are prepared 
there. There are two things that happen, it's either you go and carry a gun or you go to 
school but you are fortunate when you get there knowing these things at the transit 
camp" (Vukani). 
The transit camp served as a preparatory zone for the respondents as new MK recruits. 
Although Vukani is not explicit on what this preparation entailed he is nevertheless, 
suggestive when referring to the "two things that happen". The imagery he conjures is that as 
an MK recruit the paths seemingly available to him then could be symbolised by, on the one 
hand, a gun and on the other, a book. This could have very well been a routing of the 'youth 
as recruit' at the military gates, if we are to think of the transit camp as such. This lack of a 
full disclosure of information between the "gun" or the "book" could be explained by the fact 
that in underground work in which the respondents were involved, people operated on a 
"need-to-know basis" (Suttner, 2008, p. 87) such that what the respondents knew depended in 
part on whom their 'contact person(s)' that facilitated their escape to exile and what that 
person knew. In addition, Bernstein (1994) asserts that the future direction of those who went 
to exile was often determined by their reasons for leaving South Africa. This suggests that 
there may have been people who, prior to leaving South Africa, knew of the gun or book path 
and decided which they were going to take. On the other hand there were those, like the 
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respondents, who learnt of these paths when they were already in MK. 
For those who ended up on the education path and were under the care of the ANC (some 
young people that were under the United Nations and other organisations were placed in 
schools in Nigeria and Zambia) were placed in Tanzania in SOMFCO (Solomon Mahlangu 
Freedom College) that operated from 1978 to 1992 (Morrow, Maaba & Pulumani, 2004). 
These authors, give a detailed account of SOMAFCO and hold that the school was intended 
to nurture, as much as possible the educational aspirations of a free South Africa; where 
academic studies and vocational training were equally valued thus, positioning itself as a 
counter to Bantu Education. Life in the school, more or less, resembled life in any British-
style boarding school where apart from attending classes students had to report for 
compulsory evening classes. The curriculum included: mathematics, biology, general science, 
geography, agriculture, literature, languages (African, English, French and Portuguese), arts 
and crafts, performing arts, public health, food and nutrition, first aid and journalism 
(Morrow, Maaba & Pulumani, 2004). 
Bernstein (1994) maintains that those who primarily went to exile to seek education generally 
fulfilled their expectations and often exceeded those expectations. According to Morrow, 
Maaba & Pulumani (2004) many former SOMAFCO students report that mathematics and 
science, which were compulsory subjects, subsequently opened up numerous opportunities; 
that their education allowed them to develop a strong sense of individuality (something which 
the military in various way discouraged in the respondents) and personal confidence; that it 
fast tracked their maturity and saved them from teenage preoccupations and that in the 
context of the time, their education showed significant intellectual openness and tolerance. In 
many ways the paths of the "book" and the "gun" are starkly different and thus, mark as 
intimately different those who were in the military and those who pursued education. The 
reports of former SAMAFCO recorded by Morrow, Maaba & Pulumani (2004) above and the 
respondents' military experiences in this study make a case for the differences in these two 
groups. Post 1994, the differences between those who obtained education while in exile and 
those who were in the military and particularly the infantry are common knowledge. It 
remains an issue for enquiry in light of the respondents' politicisation and that many students 
in exile wanted to join the anny and many had to be dissuaded (Bernstein, 1994) whether the 
respondents would have chosen the "book" over the "gun". The military path nevertheless, 
had political education: 
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"This is when political classes are introduced to reunite us and it brings to an end this 
mentality that I am Xhosa or a Zulu, no, we are all comrades here" (Vukani). 
" ... being an MK soldier you must automatically be a political soldier because you are 
being taught politics so that you know who you are fighting and what you are fighting 
for. So we were taught politics so that we could be guided by politics in everything 
we do ... Umkhonto weSizwe was 20% fighting and 80 percent politics" (Philani). 
" ... the ANC had this mentality that before you give a soldier a gun you first have to 
give him political education" (Thabani). 
For Vukani political education challenged apartheid' ethnicisation and built camaraderie 
among a diverse group of MK soldiers. Philani on the other hand perceived political 
education to have been instructional as a guiding philosophy for MK soldiers who had to 
know the enemy and the reasons for fighting that is also echoed by Thabani. It is this 
emphasis on political awareness which leads Philani to assert that being an MK soldier meant 
that he was a political soldier. Cock (1991) has noted that the SADF and MK were not only 
different in terms of skill, technology and resources but social organisation and ideology. 
This political education can be seen as continuation of the processes of politicisation from 
civilian life; political education was the ideological guide for change that MK was 
contributing toward. 
5.2.2 Camp orientation 
" ... in orientation you are orientated in the wilderness that you are in. The reason they 
are orientating us is so that they do not find us in a danger zone ... they orientate us 
about the camp and its surroundings" (Thabani). 
No longer in his familiar civilian surroundings Thabani was being protected from dangers 
that were alien to him. Moreover, the military was swiftly yet subtly taking over Thabani's 
life: firstly, by geographically and spatially demarcating his place. Secondly, implicit in this 
was also the establishment of power relations between the military and Thabani, a positioning 
of the dominant and the subordinate respectively. 
50 
5.3 Training camp 
From the transit camps the recruits were moved to different training camps. In the 
respondents experiences these were Angola, Uganda or Tanzania. 
5.3.1 Welcome to the army 
"My brother it was not easy. You know when you get to a place and the people who 
have been there treat you as though you have come to the wrong place" (Thabani). 
" ... we also had that civilian mentality thinking that we had come to the wrong place ... 
they were making us do things that we did not like they were still removing civilian 
life in us and introducing us to military life" (Vukani). 
" ... their program was such they were going to make us do exercises to welcome us to 
the bush for those two weeks because we were from civilian life and were not exposed 
to military life" (Philani). 
Common to all three quotes is a sense of having come to the wrong place. Interestingly all 
three respondents are quick to explain the disorientation on their arrival to have been the 
result of their civilian orientation. Although at this point it is not clear what exactly it is that 
the respondents experienced it is nevertheless clear that it was unpleasant. The aim it seems 
was to distinctly separate, in the psyche of the respondents, the military from civilian life. At 
the point of departure from South Africa, the respondents left their families, friends and 
girlfriends thus, physically leaving behind their civilian lives with all its familiarities. 
Psychologically the respondents still had to be purged from their civilian mentality and being 
disoriented might have started to disrupt their civilian point of reference. 
5.3.2 Cutting the civilian umbilical cord 
"You are told go to sleep, eat, you understand. That is bad because you are no longer 
controlling yourself, no you can't make a decision. All decisions are made for you. 
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Just imagine that kind of life where you are told when to eat, bath and things like that. 
That stressed me a lot" (Vukani). 
The setting of a daily routine and a discipline of the body was, for the new recruit the 
beginning of a "taking over" of his person. Freedoms that Vukani had taken for granted in his 
civilian life partly because bathing, eating and sleeping appear basic and trivial, were 
suddenly lost. These decisions and rights were removed from the personal to a higher order, 
consequently entrenching the power relations between him as the protected and the military 
as the protector and additionally positioning the military as the "thinker" and him the 
"regulated doer". 
When probed about what exactly happened at this point Vukani continued saying that: 
"I have experienced many things ... that a person can go for five days without food just 
training only ... you wear military clothes ... We did not sleep at night singing ... for three 
days no sleep, you are being prepared" (Vukani). 
Through these institutionalised deprivations, disciplines and markings the military made it 
clear to Vukani that he was now part of a different institutional order; his civilian clothes 
were substituted for military unifonn thus, signifying his new identity and making him one 
amongst many in a group mainly constituted by men. The deprivation of basic needs rendered 
him hopeless and dependent on the military for survival and sufficiently vulnerable for 
remoulding from civilian man to military man. 
5.3.3 'This is not your mother's house' 
" ... The thing is in soldiering, they tell you and you too will understand that this is not 
your mother's house ... they are removing you from civilian life and introducing you to 
soldiering and you might think that it's abuse" (Vukani). 
Vukani's experiences hitherto in the military had culminated to the point in fact that "this is 
not his mother's house" through which the military was declaring itself neither a feminine nor 
childhood space of love and care. It was a space for cutting the umbilical cord to civilian life. 
Intensified politicisation in the 1980s marked civilian life as a space in which the respondents 
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as part of the youth were at the forefront of the revolutionary struggle; perceiving themselves 
as "key agents of social and political change and as defenders of their communities against 
repressive security forces" (Marks & McKenzie, 1995, p. 3). 
In his assessment of youth politics at the time Bundy (1987) sees "an essential dualism in 
youth politics: on the one hand, it is characteristically militant and dynamic; on the other 
hand, by its nature is short on theoretical sophistication and experience. Youth/student 
politics in a time of crisis is a hybrid of precocity and immaturity." (Seekings, 1993, p. 11). 
The military then, as total institution was working to cut the umbilical cord to civilian 
political life that encouraged 'ungovernability', 'immediacy', and 'triumphalism'. It was 
cutting the civilian struggle masculinity of 'ungovernability' that had no place in the military 
space. This is because total institutions, like the military, "do not substitute their own unique 
culture for something that is already formed" (Goffrnan, 1961, p. 23) and it is for this reason 
that the military treats individualism as a "myth that rules civilian society" (Nisbet, 1945, p. 
264) and that in tum leaves the door of spontaneous adjudication open for the individual. 
5.4 Pulling it together: adjusting to military life 
In camp orientation the military, as we see in Thabani' s case, worked to assign the new 
recruit to his position by geo-spatially demarcating his boundaries, his section of the field. 
Thabani was allocated his rightful place at the bottom of the hierarchical structure and 
consequently was positioned to be dependent on the military institution for protection. 
On arriving at the training camps the respondents were overwhelmed by a sense of having 
'come to the wrong place'. Their explanations do not give an account of why their civilian 
mentality would lead them to think that they had come to the wrong place. What it does 
suggest, is that there was a misfit between the civilian world that they were embedded in and 
the military world that they were now becoming members of. What 'coming to the wrong 
place' represented was a moment of ontological rupture between respondents' civilian life 
dispositions and the military. It is this moment of rupture that signified to the respondents that 
they were now 'on the inside' (Goffman, 1961). 
Taken together the deprivation of sleep and food and the simultaneous issuing of military 
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unifonn sent a double message to the respondents. In the first instance, it served to deface 
the respondents, marking them as identical bodies that were part of a larger body of 
predominately men. Military equipment (unifonn) is what gave them identity and by 
extension they too were military equipment. Secondly, the deprivation of food and sleep was 
a 'language of warning' to precisely encourage confonnity that was symbolised by the 
unifonn and its attendant implications for obedience, and discipline. As Colonel Frederick 
Weiner, u.S. put it: "Harsh, yes, but the underlying concept of any anny is obedience. How 
else can this regimented obedience be attained unless such obedience is made attractive by 
comparison with the fate in store for those who prefer individualism." (Spindler, 1949, p. 86). 
The elimination of unpredictable behaviours and discouragement of individualism served to 
make the recruits infants in a new military space in which they would need to be socialised. 
What the respondents experienced up to this point did not, in the least, speak to assertions of 
manhood, adulthood, dignity or freedom, a project that MK was meant to be taking forward. 
To the contrary, freedom of choice was eliminated thus, arresting the development of 
maturity and adulthood; dignity was assaulted through various debasements and deprivations; 
personal identity was substituted for institutional identity and given a 'copyright' stamp by 
making individualism undesirable. Tactically then, a sort of straightjacket trusteeship and 
overlordship was imposed upon the respondents, if you like, by their comrades. 
What all this appears to have been was the moment-by-moment beginning of the construction 
of the MK soldier as 'masculine warrior-hero' not in the sense of a structure constructing and 
imposing it upon a subject; or an agent whimsically undertaking the "original project" of self 
creation as the "uncreated creator" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 132) but as the "doing of 
masculinity" (Coleman, 1990, p. 191) in the relation between the respondents and 
commanders. This relation deemed necessary the "civilian death" (Goffman, 1961, p. 25) and 
the end of individualism that would give way to the doing of masculinity in MK. This 
'civilian death' as we have seen it was something of an "admission fee" Bourdieu and 
Wacquant (1992, p. 107) that legitimised the respondents as ready for basic training. With 
this preparatory work done what now remained was the making of the MK soldier. 
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SECTION 2 
5.5 Basic military training 
When Philani was asked to give an overview of what basic training entailed he reported that: 
"It was political training, there was fire arm training, there was engineering training 
like ... whereby you have to know how to use explosives and you must know how to 
assemble and disassemble a firearm within a short space of time because you are 
preparing yourself for when you are in a battle field and your firearm jams and you 
have to be able to disassemble and assemble it back so that you can retaliate back at 
the enemy. Then there was first aid training, then topography whereby you have to 
know your surroundings in case you get lost and you must know how to use the 
compass during the day and at night. Then we had physical training and tactics ... that 
is military tactics, how to lay an ambush, how to counter an ambush and launch 
attacks ... how to manoeuvre, how to overcome the mine fields" (Philani). 
Cock's (1991) account concurs with Philani' s report in which she maintains that basic 
training included firearms instruction, explosives and engineering, battle tactics, topography, 
military strategy and revolutionary politics. Talking specifically about physical training 
Vukani reported that: 
" ... nobody has time for you in training and they bend you, you are bent...Sometimes 
you even get physically beaten if you do not comply with the orders because if you 
refuse to do this thing what kind of a soldier are you going to be that hesitates when 
you see a gun? You will be busy hesitating and somebody kills you. You say you 
want to liberate South Africa but you are still hesitating ... " (Vukani). 
In that "nobody has time for you" what Vukani is pointing out is the impersonal nature of his 
relations with the training instructor. Emotionally closed off from his own feelings the 
commander could with ease act on a recruit's body as an object to 'bend' and mould from its 
civilian clumsiness into a military disciplined body. Should the body under military 
construction resist as when Vukani fails to comply with an order, it is immediately punished 
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into obedience. Nisbet (1945) points out that the military's ultimate goal is the "quick and 
efficient destruction of the enemy and all other goals must be subordinate to this; all 
situations and relationships which hinder its attainment must be prevented" (p. 264). This 
begins to shed light on the institutional reasoning behind the abolishment of activities such as 
(decision-making, autonomy, individual identity, fear etc.) that would otherwise interfere 
with the respondent's efficient training. After being purged of his civilian reference and 
discouraged from thinking and taking self responsibility by having all matters of food, 
clothing and shelter settled by the military, Vukani was expected to take orders made upon 
his body with no hesitation. Hesitation translated to unpredictability, incalculability and death 
that in tum would abort national liberation. 
"Not to mention food, you can stay for two weeks without eating and without being 
hungry just drinking water that's all, just water because they are squeezing you and 
shaping you" (Vukani). 
If physical bodily boundaries were being bent the body from within was equally disciplined 
by squeezing and shaping its interior; the unseen and the fluidity that flows without control to 
match the topography of his body. It was this attempt to control the body's interior that 
Thabani saw as "stomach discipline": 
" ... the difficult thing is stomach exercise because I remember one day we were in a 
parade and our lunch time was one 0' clock and ended at half past one. So it happened 
that I was the tenth person from the back of the line and by twenty eight minutes past 
I was only getting my food and by half past the combat bell went off signalling "dish 
down" ... This was after six hours of topography exercise and I had to do it because it 
was an order and go back to another six hours of running ... you must have stomach 
discipline and stomach discipline is not any easy thing to do" (Thabani). 
The recruits lives being reduced to orders allowed for: control of what they ate and drank, 
when they ate and drank, how much they ate and drank and also how much time they were 
allocated to eat thus, controlling the pace and emotions attached to the act of replenishing the 
body. The military seems to have had total control on the recruits bodies, emotions and 
psychology. 
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" ... you walk ten kilometres to fetch wood and its big logs not just anything small 
because you want to prove to the other company that you are not weak but you are fit 
dogs" (Vukani). 
Training appears to have been intimately linked with competition. Competition seems to have 
provided the recruits with a medium to prove that they were something other than weak. If 
weakness was the antithesis, physical toughness and durability were celebrated and aspired 
to. The recruits had not only to prove themselves by walking long distances and carrying 
logs but through these acts, had to show without doubt that they were "fit dogs", creatures of 
instincts. After being animalised it seems that it was easy for the respondents to also refer and 
think of themselves as animals. Equating training as a soldier with being a dog is particularly 
interesting in light of the fact that in conventional armies soldiers are issued with "dog tags". 
" ... we did not believe that training can kill a person until this one experience we had 
where a comrade died while we were training ... the commanders said "ja the course is 
going well" and so we wanted to understand what that means and they said "no, it is a 
sign that the training is going well once a comrade gives up his testicles" ... no one 
wanted to give up their testicles." (Thabani) 
Thabani shows us the extremity to which basic training was taken to the point that lives were 
lost. The casual manner in which the commandos read the death of a trainee as a sign that 
training was at its optimal is suggestive of the depth of dehumanisation. The death of a recruit 
was instead read a as a 'giving up of his testicles'; an organ that is among the keys symbols 
of his heterosexual masculinity. Therefore, his dying in training was being read as an act of 
cowardice. The commanders response can be understood as an acknowledgement that 
through training he had been able to "weed-out" the fraudulent and impotent testicles and 
phallus and by default selecting those who remain standing in that celebrated proud stance of 
virility. Physical training had the potential of exposing those men who had low tolerance for 
bodily strain in that transformation of the civilian body into a military body. 
5.6 Commander and soldier: power and violation 
"When I was a soldier I was a different person because at that time you lived by 
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command. They tell you that here you do what you are told and not what you think. 
So of course you were like a sheep as 1 said before" (Vukani). 
The life of a soldier is different among other things and perhaps more importantly because, as 
Vukani points, that a soldier lives by command. The whole of his life had been stripped of the 
complexities, drudgeries and nuances of civilian life and the only thing that stood before and 
higher than him was the 'god of commands' which he was to be unconditionally devoted to. 
The highest law of the land in the military was 'do and don't think' which Vukani sees as a 
particular program of mind control that made him and every other soldier in his position into 
a herd of sheep. 
"I would see an old man who probably had a son my age putting bread in his pocket 
because of the 'dish down' order ... and when we are inspected you find that father 
taking bread out of his pocket ... and I saw that an old man can tum into a baby" 
(Thabani). 
The 'ordered life' as a 'life lived by orders' served not only to mind control but also to 
infantilise without discrimination and thereby insulting dignity, manhood and adulthood. That 
a man that Thabani regarded as a father was forced to hide food in his pocket speaks to the 
degree of profanation suffered by the soldier, and to show that he could not escape the totality 
of surveillance upon him, he was inspected and exposed as a fraud and delinquent. 
"Sometimes we would be ordered to go and defuse landmines and landmines were 
human solid waste buried in the ground. The whole unit would be ordered to defuse 
landmines and you can't say that it was not you who did that and that was not easy" 
(Thabani). 
This strongly suggests itself to be pure unmasked dehumanisation and abuse of power which 
may lead to an interest in the extent to which those giving such orders must have 
dehumanised themselves first to make it possible for them to dehumanise others in tum. 
Striking in these narratives is what appears to have been MK's relentless goal to infantilise 
and strip its trainees of any sense of individuality during basic military training. A similar 
observation is made by Cock (1991) in the South African Defence Force and remarks that in 
making soldiers, "military training involves stripping young men of their individuality ... "(p. 
56). As the narratives show, older men in MK were not exempt from this depersonalisation as 
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it appears that all who entered MK were subject to infantalisation, animalisation and 
dehumanisation at the hands of their commanders. The narratives above reveal the relations 
between men in MK. They reveal the relations between the respondents as "infantry" and 
their commanders as a relation of power. 
As striking as these relations are, it should be recognised that both the respondents and 
commanders operated within the dictates of the totality of the military and its hierarchical 
structure that positioned and socialised them to produce the power relations and practices that 
obtained between them. Moreover, both the dominant and the dominated were bound by the 
revolutionary thinking of the ANC that was influenced by Marxist text that could be traced 
back to the Soviet Union. Among the premises of this revolutionary thought was that 
"revolutionaries were suppose to realise themselves as individuals within the context of the 
collective" (Suttner, 2008, p. 133). The idea was that the revolutionary as individual was to 
expect nothing at the personal but had to be "prepared to sacrifice all personal needs in order 
to ensure the success of the struggle. Consequently, no sacrifice is too great and there is no 
situation where the personal needs can supplant those of the organisation" (ibid., p. 139). For 
the respondents the sacrifice of the personal included suffering defacements, being 
infantilised and animalised, denied their dignity and living a life guided by military 
overlordhsip and trusteeship. As a collective, publicly and socially the respondents were MK 
revolutionary soldiers and ideological warrior-heroes. However, personally, psychologically 
and privately they were infantile men. These were the men and soldiers who were constructed 
not only by MK but the whole field of resistance ideologies in their relations with the 
oppreSSIve apartheid state. Finally, in Connell's hegemony relational framework and 
Bourdieu's concept of field the commanders can be conceived to have held a dominant 
masculine position. The respondents, initially as trainees and later as soldiers, occupied a 
position of subordinate masculinity. 
5.7 The Fe-male Challenge: the spring source of the masculine 
" ... it is even worse when there is a woman and she does things better than you and 
they ask you, how come is it that a woman is out performing you? How come you 
can't do what she is doing?" (Thabani). 
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Such a situation throws into question the male recruit's manliness which he is already 
required to prove by the dictates of basic training and military life. The very presence of 
women calls for him to double his efforts at proving his manliness through mastery of 
exercises. The question ultimately arises about his inability to do what a woman can do. At 
once he finds himself judged against a woman and found wanting in a place that is 
supposedly a man's world. The fact that a woman accomplishes the task implies that the issue 
is not with the task at hand but rather with him, his inabilities, his impotence and hence his 
masculinity. The question 'How come you can't do what she is doing?' becomes a permanent 
label of embarrassment and a reason to demote him from the ladder of manhood. Henceforth 
his manhood will perpetually be wanting until he redeems himself from his fatal mistake. 
"I had women even in my company and you found that they were more powerful than 
men ... They are very powerful with guns, they are good, serious because they have 
breasts and they put the gun between their breasts and it sat comfortably and they are 
accurate" (Vukani). 
The acknowledgement of women's competency is explained in a manner that objectifies her; 
she is seen through fragmented eyes that refuse to see her as a full human being and 
consequently the entire repertoire of her emotions, bodily skills and intellect that allow her to 
do what she has become good at is reduced to her breasts. This achieves two different things 
at the same time. On the one hand, by finding a 'comfortable fit' between the gun and the 
breast where the gun sits comfortably between the breasts Vukani eroticizes the gun and in 
turn eroticizes the phallus after which the gun is modelled. On the other hand the same 
breasts are 'masculinised' by implicating that she is able to shoot accurately because of her 
breasts. In other words, that she is on par and might even surpass males in the shooting range 
can only be explained by the advantage given to her by her breasts which also have adopted a 
manly stance hence their usefulness in handling a rifle. There is some evidence that women 
were competent shooters but breasts are not mentioned as having had any direct bearing on 
this, if at all. For example, Cock (1991) interviewed a woman who was in MK who reported 
that "We are more disciplined than men. We make better drivers. Also women are good 
sharpshooters-in training we really excelled" (p. 163). 
"Women in the camp turned to men because they had adopted that male mentality 
because they were always dominated by men. So you see that a woman was a woman 
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but her lifestyle had changed, she had that male mentality because of the influence" 
(Thabani). 
Perhaps as a way of coming to terms and rationalising the competency displayed by women 
as reported by Vukani, Thabani sees women as having turned into men, suggesting that their 
'civilian death' was insufficient and in addition a 'death of femininity' was necessary. The 
only way that women could be recognised and acknowledged is if they were projected as 
having assumed a "masculine femininity". Thabo also gives insight into the place of women 
in MK as being "always dominated by men"-where the totality of 'always' might have 
extended to sexual domination and abuse of women. 
To fu11y understand what it meant for a male recruit to be cast away for re-training let us 
consider the concept of abject. For Julia Kristeva the abject is the "suppressed elements that 
is indispensible to the generation and maintenance of identity which, implies that they cannot 
be entirely eliminated" (cited in Pietrzak-Franger, 2006, p. 64-65). In other words, the 
summoning of faltering male soldiers to retraining was an attempt to deny and reject that 
males could be taken to task by physical strain given that physical prowess has generally, and 
specifica11y in the military, been made a male monopoly. As an act of abjection, retraining 
was a suppression of physical weakness that has been associated with femininity. This 
abjection was an attempt to uphold a11 that has been associated with being a soldier and a man 
in the military. 
5.8 The spear-and-pot dichotomy myth 
If women in the military can, as we have seen, be equally competent as men and at times 
surpass them, the relationship between men and the military that has often been taken as 
'natural' must finally be questioned. Respondents were asked how they would explain the 
attraction of men in large numbers to the military, they report that: 
"Men always tell themselves that they are powerful and that is why the military is fu11 
of them. They tell themselves that in any event they are supposed to do this. You can 
go to any country you won't hear of military women but you hear of military men 
because they tell themselves that the military is their place. This goes back to our 
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forefathers where protection was the duty of men and women's business was the pot, 
they have to attend to the pots ... you didn't see a women carrying a spear, no you 
didn't, dating back to our forefathers" (Vukani). 
What Vukani is suggesting is that what has become a historic tradition of men assuming the 
role of protectors might be easily explained by the fact that men have "told themselves that 
they are powerful" and that this practice "goes back to our forefathers". Based on this 'self-
appointment' and 'self proclamation' as protectors men made MK their place and a place in 
which they could in the company of and in partnership with other men play the role of 
protectors and freedom fighters. From this, statements such as "the military will make a man 
of you" easily follow and are quickly and uncritically consumed. By joining the military men 
were purporting to be taking their place as protectors and in that also defining the place of 
women. From this came the protector and the protected; the spear and the pot, the battle 
ground and the plantation fields and from which follows: "I'll bring the bacon, you cook it" 
discourse. 
" .. .I will say we men in the olden days were in the army and it appeared as though the 
army was a place for men. It appeared as a place for men but when women were 
allowed to join they showed that they too can do what the men were doing" (Philani). 
When women are given access to the military some prove themselves to be competent and 
hence become the 'female challenge' as we have seen. The challenge posed by women is not 
only a challenge to the practical doings of men such as handling a gun. At a fundamental 
level the competence demonstrated by women challenges the male patriarchal and 
heterosexual discourse that erected the military as a haven for men, it challenges their role as 
the only protectors and it challenges the way in which the claim "men are powerful" was 
launched in a way that portrayed women as powerless. Put differently, it challenges the 
"spear" and "pot" dichotomy discourse which crudely enforces traditional heterosexual 
roles-the spear pierces and penetrates and the pot receives and contains. Furthermore, it 
exposes the posing of men as protectors and warrior heroes as having been dependent on the 
maintenance of the spear- and-pot dichotomy such that the debunking of this dichotomy 
immediately reveals the historic tradition of the warrior hero as perhaps nothing more than 
the "traditionalist historic warrior myth". This is not to suggest that there have been no 
warriors and heroes in the history of resistance against conquest and oppression; rather it is to 
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point out that their emergence and ideological existence has been possible in large part on the 
background of women being denied the opportunity to play the same role; and when they did, 
they were made invisible. Coulter, Persson & Utas (2008) make a similar observation and 
remark that young women have been combatants in contemporary African wars and yet 
"have, by and large, remained invisible" (p. 5). This rendering of women as invisible when 
they take up roles as fighters alongside men mirrors the social dichotomy that relegates 
women to the "pot" (the private, household and family sphere) and men to the "spear" (the 
political, public and military sphere) (Lyons, 2004, Mankayi, 2006). This shows the way that 
women as soldiers were marginalised in gender relations by men even by those men, such as 
the respondents, who were themselves subordinated. 
5.9 Conclusion 
The exile context was distinctly different from the apartheid context. The power relations in 
exile between the respondents as soldier trainees and their commanders were characterised by 
a strong sense of domination and control of trainees. This was not evident in South Africa in 
the relations between the respondents and politically mature ANC cadres. A strong feature of 
this domination was the infantilisation reported by respondents. Similar to the infantilisation 
of the apartheid context, though not racialised, here too, respondents were denied their 
adulthood and in turn overlordship was imposed upon them. The difference though is that in 
exile it was not the apartheid system that infantilised them but their comrades and 
commanders in the struggle. Important to note however, is that, unlike apartheid South 
Africa, the power relations and infantilisation in exile were rooted within military discourse 
and not in apartheid ideology. 
In addition to this, military discourse played a central role in the socialisation of respondents 
into military life and combatant masculinities in at least two ways. First, through the negation 
of femininity that was posed as an antithesis of what it meant to be a heterosexual masculine 
soldier. This simultaneously rendered the construction of masculinity as an opposition to 
anything attributed to femininity. This practice was clearly revealed in the relations between 
the respondents and women in training that positioned women as unequal to men. Secondly, 
the negation of civilian life, although often intertwined with femininity, was different from it. 
While femininity may have included attributes such as physical weakness and showing 
emotions, negation of civilian life was characterised by a systematic stripping of autonomy 
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and spontaneous behaviour that was replaced with obedience to authority and confinement in 
space and time. The combination of these factors worked to deconstruct and reconfigure the 
respondents' militant civilian masculinities of apartheid South Africa. 
The construction of a new military identity was outwardly visible through depersonalised 
military uniform that correlated with the psychological uniform of obedience and conformity 
that reduced persons to military cogs. To this process, military training added dehumanisation 
and animalisation; bodily surveillance and punishment in the transformation of civilian 
bodies into synchronised military bodies and a collective military machine. Lastly, deeply 
interwoven into the respondents experiences of military life were two contradicting themes. 
On the one hand, the respondents were constructed as fighters, protectors and providers and 
women as weak and the protected thus reproducing traditional patriarchal and heterosexual 
discourse. On the other hand, the same men were subjected to defacements and practices that 
undermined their personal freedoms, undennined their adulthood and sense of manhood and 
made them subordinate to other men. 
In contrast to the civilian struggle masculinity of 'ungovernability' South Africa, exile 
constructed a militarised masculinity that was highly regimented and institutionalised, 
infantilised and animalised. This masculinity was subordinate to commanders, lived by 
commands, and at the same time complicit with hegemonic masculinity in subjugating 
women and negating femininity. These military men subscribed to the patriarchal and 
heterosexual discourse that portrayed them as providers and protectors. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE RETURNED SOLDIER 
... in Xhosa culture they say that 'the father died with a bandanna on his head' which means 
that the father was not responsible enough ... (Thabani) 
Yes, we are called the heads of households but women are 'key'. A woman can survive 
without a job and still raise jive children on her own and have children who are successful in 
life. (Vukani) 
This chapter explores (a) some of the challenges confronting respondents as returned soldiers 
attempting to reintegrate into society and (b) respondents' struggles with different meanings 
of masculinity as they attempt to renegotiate and reconstruct their masculinities in a 
democratic dispensation. 
6.1 Failed Demobilisation 
Consideration had not been made for those ex-combatants who did not meet integration 
requirements into the then new South African Defence Force (SANDF) and for those that 
simply had no interest in a military career. The Transitional Executive Council Act of 1993 
and the Interim Constitution of 1993 made no provisions for these categories of ex-
combatants (Mashike, 2004). Demobilisation seems to have been an afterthought and the 
planning of which only began in the face of "a crisis over what to do with elderly and infirm 
soldiers" and those not interested in military life (Motumi & McKenzie, 1998, p. 197). The 
Defence Minister defined demobilisation as "the voluntary release of fonner non-statutory 
force (MK and APLA) members, who are constitutionally part of the SANDF, but who did 
not wish to serve in the full-time force or who were unable to do so" (ibid., p. 194). 
Demobilisation had three components. The first, a once-off gratuity depending on the soldiers 
period of service, second, a limited two week counselling on personal and career matters, 
social services and finances. Third, was an opportunity to join the Service Corps for a 
maximum of 18 month period (Mashike, 2000). The breakdown of the gratuities in 
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accordance with years of service in MK was as follows: 22-23 years (R 42657), 18-21 years 
(R 32 276), 12-17 years (R 28 721), 5-11 years (20 201) and 0-4 years (R 12 734) (Mashike, 
2004, p. 93). In this study, Mashike reports that over a third of respondents reported that they 
did not receive a gratuity. Reasons for this included: "not being part of the official integration 
and demobilisation process; joining the SANDF and then resigning or being dismissed; 
administrative problems; being informed that they did not qualify for the demobilisation 
package (2004, p. 92). However, Mashike points out that there is evidence to suggest that ex-
combatants squandered their gratuities within days after receiving a lump-sum payment. This 
squandering of money is partly an expression of a "lack of financial management skills" 
(ibid., p. 94). It is possible that some ex-combatants might have felt themselves rich and as a 
result bought "presents and hosted parties to please friends and family" (ibid.). These acts 
might have helped ex-combatants to "gain a false sense of social reintegration as they are 
often surrounded by people who treat them as heroes ... The depletion of gratuities was soon 
replaced by rejection" (ibid.). 
The poor planning, if at all, of the demobilisation process is what seems to have been the 
source of other problems that have undermined the process of demobilisation. The 
"inadequacy and unsystematic" nature of demobilisation was "reflected in the absence of any 
attempt to win support for it". Instead the planning and implementation took a top-down 
approach without the involvement of ex-combatants and civil society as experience from 
other countries like Uganda suggest is the best way to go about it (Motumi & McKenzie, 
1998, p. 197). Motumi and Hudson maintain that some of the areas in which information was 
lacking in planning for demobilisation included; "the families of those to be demobilised, 
circumstances in the areas where fonner combatants would reside after demobilisation, the 
attitude of people in these areas, criteria according to which successful reintegration into civil 
society could be judged, mechanisms whereby a demobilised soldier could obtain ongoing 
assistance and advice, the social effects of demobilisation on the demobilised soldier and on 
society at large, employment opportunities, training needs of, and training opportunities for, 
those to be demobilised etc." (1996, p. 122). 
Other shortcomings of the demobilisation process that are linked to poor planning include the 
once-off gratuity packages. Besides that the gratuities were not sufficient to meet the needs of 
ex-combatants they are also a short-tem solution to a problem that could not be solved by a 
once-off payment that is not channelled to log-term productive activity. A World Bank study 
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of seven countries' demobilisation programmes cited by Motumi and Mckenzie (1998) 
reported that payments needs to be supplemented by other reintegration or ways to encourage 
the use of cash payment to be used for education or productive investments. Furthermore, 
these authors maintain that the demobilisation legislation was passed much later such that 
those eligible for demobilisation could not claim their benefits until the Demobilisation Bill 
was passed. It has become difficult to escape the conclusion that the demobilisation process 
has be "a complete mess" and therefore even more difficult to accept the claim of some 
senior ANC politicians that "as far as demobilisation and assistance for ex-combatants goes, 
'the book is closed' " (Everatt and Jennings, 2006, p. 21-22). 
6.2 Education and employment 
In a survey study of 180 MK returned soldiers Cock (1993) reports that all had suffered some 
disruption in their education although more than half had at least completed what is now 
grade nine. In the same sample, 42 had a diploma of some kind, 64 were studying mainly by 
correspondence for security related qualification and 11 had university courses and only 5 
had completed degrees (ibid., p. 2). In a study of a national sample of 410 returned MK and 
APLA soldiers Mashike (2004) showed that "close to 60 percent of respondents do not have a 
matric certificate ... , 26 percent have standard 10, while 5 percent have standard 10 and a 
diploma and 2 percent have a postgraduate degree or diploma" (p. 98). In the same study 33 
percent of respondents reported to have received some form of education or skills training 
while in MK or APLA. The nature of education between respondents differed such that some 
hold degrees and diplomas, other completed the secondary schooling while many received 
training in "electronics, bricklaying, carpentry, motor mechanics, welding, computer courses, 
dressmaking, office practice, business skills and security (ibid.). In another study Mashike 
(2000) maintains that there is "conflicting evidence on the opportunities to study offered to 
MK soldiers in exile." MK soldiers, according to most respondents, were given the 
opportunity to study which some misused for example, by "squandering funds instead of 
paying their tuition." The misuse of funds seems to have been motivated by the belief, widely 
held by some soldiers that "they would return to South Africa with everything arranged for 
them" (ibid., p. 67-68). MK soldiers were apparently given a choice to pursue formal 
education, military education or both that was offered in countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria. Many 
chose not to study and instead chose military education with the view that they wanted to 
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fight the apartheid regime (Mashike, 2004, p.98). The argument is that opportunities to study 
depended on ties with commanding officers (Mashike, 2000) while respondents of this 
reported that knowledge of study opportunities depended on contact persons from South 
Africa. 
Not holding a matric certificate has meant that many returned soldiers have been unable to 
enter the formal job market which generally discriminates against those who have not 
finished their secondary schooling (Mashike, 2004). In Cock (1993) a majority of 
respondents were unemployed with only 35 of the 180 holding full-time employment in 
"ANC, MK and South African Communist Party (SACP) structures" and only "9 employed 
in mainstream organisation" (p. 3). Unemployment was reported by 66 percent of 
respondents in Mashike's (2004) study, 9 percent were directly dependent on some pension 
or government grant, 3 percent were supported by family or friends and 16 percent were 
involved in income generating projects or were entrepreneurs (p. 99). Both Mashike and 
Cock maintained that this was part of a broader problem where four million of a ten million 
potentially economically active population was currently unemployed. What made MK and 
APLA cadres particularly vulnerable were their lack of both marketable skills and work 
experience (Cock, 1993; Mashike, 2004). In addition to this, not having "personal contacts 
with influential individuals who can facilitate access to employment.. . and privatisation" 
(Mashike, 2004, p. 99) were provided as reasons for not being employed. Some respondents 
could not give an explanation for being unemployed. Lastly, Mashike points out that despite 
the disagreement on unemployment rates given by Statistic South Africa (2001) estimated at 
29,4 percent; South African Institute for Race Relations (2001) estimate of 39 percent and 
the Global Insight Research Company (2001) estimate of 48,9 percent it is "evident that it 
would be difficult for the South African labour market to absorb demobilised ex-combatants" 
(Mashike, 2004, p. 98-99). 
Respondents of this study also report the lack of education to be a barrier in their attempts to 
get employment and play the role of providers for their families. 
"You know, sometimes there is nothing more painful than having a family and yet 
you are not responsible enough ... some of us want to take that responsibility of being a 
provider for your family because you know that you wasted a lot of time in exile and 
you did not work for them but now is the time to prove your manhood and be a 
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provider in the home"(Thabani). 
Central to Thabani is his ability to be a provider for his family the failure of which brings him 
pain. Thabani' s comment that exile was a waste of time is significant and should be read in 
relation to the salience he places in being able to provide for his family (his mother, his son 
which he had after returning from exile and his partner). What Thabani is suggesting is that 
he could have used the time he spent in exile to work for his family instead he returns unable 
to responsibility for his family. The sense of wasted time may also be understood in light of 
Mashike and Mokalobe (2003) observation that "most former MK and APLA combatants had 
expected to gain employment or adequate support to secure employment or a profession in 
either the public or private sectors after the 1994 elections" (p.20). Thabo also links his 
ability to play the role of a provider to his sense of manhood and as a benchmark for his 
manhood. 
"At home I have a partner and I have children but in all of that I don't have education. 
I still want education .. .in order that I can be alright and have a good job and take care 
of my family. The thing that hit us hard while we were in exile is that we did not 
acquire any skills besides military skills. So those are the challenges, that now you are 
faced with life and it does not need military skills, no it does not need military skills" 
(Vukani). 
Vukani's obstacle to providing for his family (which he also started on his return from exile) 
is that he does not have education which he perceives would give him opportunities that 
would allow him to better take care of his family. Matters are made more challenging by the 
fact that his military skills seem to amount to nothing in his post liberation life. Unarmed 
with skills and education Vukani finds himself out of sync in the new dispensation that 
military life did not prepare him for. 
Notwithstanding these challenges and the feeling that time he spent in exile was a waste, 
Thabani is determined to get education. This phenomenon was also observed by Cock (1993, 
p. 3) where 116 returned soldiers showed an interest in continuing their formal education. 
"So in the challenges that you face you resolve to engage or arm yourself with 
education because although time has gone by but education has no time and you can 
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still get education in order that you get a job and work" (Thabani). 
Vukani on the other hand did not express the same interest but instead maintained that he is 
part ofthose ex-combatants who think that they have reached a cul-de-sac. 
"If you come across opportunities for comrades to education themselves, to arm 
themselves make those opportunities available to them and the stories that you write, 
tell them with pride and say that you are who you are today because of these people. 
This will help those people like me who are still telling themselves that this is the end 
of the world, I mean if they hear about ex-combatants and the role that they played in 
South Africa" (Vukani). 
In various ways the challenges reported by the respondents seem to make a case for what may 
be called the "plight of the ex-combatant" that in part has been the consequence of not being 
properly demobilised and reintegrated into society. That is to say that there is a compelling 
sense in these narratives that the respondents are left to their own devices with little if any 
support to address the personal problems that confront them on their return from exile. There 
is evidently a link between a lack of education and unemployment in this study as has been 
shown by Cock (1993) and Mashike (2000, 2004). 
6.3 Military, culture and manhood 
Significant as these challenges are they were however, not the only ones facing returned 
soldiers. 
"Point number one, I had told myself that I had to go for initiation ... I'm still a 
'inkwenkwe' (a boy) and friends that I grew up were men by then ... so that is one of 
the things that frustrated me in my life that I had to still go for initiation .. .If you're a 
'boy' you are limited in the scope of things that you can do generally and among other 
men, just like as a troop you have very little to say but the commando is accountable 
for you" (Thabani). 
Being uninitiated is equivalent to being arrested in boyhood that results in low status and a 
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general restriction of what one can do and say in relations with other men. Moreover, being 
'inkwenkwe' was similar to being a foot soldier, a position he occupied in MK, whereas 
Thabani seems to think that initiation would elevate him to a position of command and 
accountability-he would be a man. 
I asked Thabani whether he thought going to the military had made him a man: 
<Laughs> "No, my brother .. .in the Xhosa culture it does not mean that you are a 
man. You can go to the military but if you are' a boy' (inkwenkwe) you will always 
be 'a boy' until you go to the bush (Xhosa manhood initiation). So yes ... the military 
does have a role that it plays, putting manhood aside, although you are 'a boy' you 
find that in the military you can do things that men cannot do and then the commander 
says you are a man while you are not really a man. The military has its influence. 
Even the bush (initiation ceremony) I had that confidence that I am man and that these 
boys here should not make the mistake of undermining me. So other initiates knew 
that they depended on me for safety and that perhaps I had a gun with me. So other 
people respect you if you were a soldier" (Thabani). 
That Thabani thinks going to the military did not mean that he was a man is significant yet 
not surprising given what he said above. What is surprising is that in his account of why 
soldiering did not make him a man he does not include neither infantilisation nor 
animalisation that featured strongly in his military experience. Instead Thabani draws on 
Xhosa culture according to which going to the military does not amount to being a man if one 
has not undergone the cultural passage of manhood. The military, through the commanders' 
affirmations, creates a 'superficial military manhood' that makes 'boys' feel like 'men'. 
Implied in this is the existence of a 'military masculinity' and a 'cultural manhood' where the 
attainment of the former does not lead to the latter. Ironically though, Thabani saw himself as 
a man for having been in the military in comparison to his peers in the manhood initiation 
ceremony who had not been soldiers. In fact he refers to them as 'boys' who depended on 
him for safety and respected him because he had been a soldier. 
What appears to be at play here is that Thabani draws on the socially accepted view that those 
who go to the military acquire a particular manhood. It is this that affords Thabani a status of 
being a man in comparison to those who had not soldiered. That said, it could be argued that 
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there is some truth in the claim that Thabani was a man, at least developmentally, on his 
return from exile, if we consider that he and other respondents joined MK between the ages 
of 14 and 16 only to return in their mid-twenties-they grew up in the military. 
" ... when I found myself an MK soldier and getting to know the politics of the ANC I 
felt proud of myself because what I was doing I was not doing it for myself, I was 
doing it for the nation, you see. I told myself that yes, I am young but I am a man, I 
am a man" (Philani). 
Soldiering for MK and comprehending ANC politics, aroused in Philani, a sense of pride 
when he understood that he was soldiering for something larger than himself-he was 
working for the nation. This irrespective of age made him feel that he was a man. Suttner 
(2008) has observed that in the ANC manhood was subtly intertwined with the concept of the 
nation, as when the original ANC restricted its membership to African men. In other words, 
playing a role in national liberation awarded one a sense of manhood and more so for those 
who were in the military wing of the ANC given the salience that has been accorded the 
military as a site of masculinity construction. The manhood-military link was also not without 
support: 
"I remember when I came back, there was a sort of a welcome party, one of the 
elderly men said, 'you became a man, even before you were a man'. Manhood in our 
culture (Xhosa) you have to go through that stage of initiation. So the way he was 
praising me for the decision that I took to leave my parents and relatives and 
everything and went to exile showed my manhood, you understand. The decision I 
took was a decision taken by men and not a boy like me" (Phil ani) 
The acknowledgement of manhood given to Philani confirmed his own feelings. It was also 
an acknowledgement of Philani as a fighter and protector of the nation and consequently of 
manhood. 'Becoming a man before you're a man' once again points to the recognition of two 
masculinities-military and cultural. Moreover, it points to the fact that these two 
masculinities are not equally valued with cultural masculinity taking first place. 
In the first interview Thabani mentioned that "a man is not a man but a man is the challenges 
that he faces in life". In the second interview I asked him to elaborate on this: 
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"It is to say that a man is not a man by going to the bush, a man is the challenges that 
he faces in life. You see, in Xhosa culture they say that 'the father died with a 
bandanna on his head' which means that the father was not responsible enough. So for 
me yes .. .I am a man, my responsibility as a man is that I have to see to it that my son 
completes his matric ... that my mother has to eat before going to bed ... in the Xhosa 
culture when you come back from the bush you are advised that you are now a man 
and you have to be a provider and build a family. So when you come back from the 
bush you know that you have to find a job and work for the family so that one day I 
can marry a woman and build my own family" (Thabani). 
Initiation into manhood does not appear to result in a permanent achievement of manhood. 
Instead it seems to be an exit from 'boyhood' and an 'entry into 'manhood'. Upon entry 
certain measures of manhood must be satisfied, namely, being a provider and protector. For 
Thabani this means that he protects and economical provides for his son and mother and 
ultimately he has to marry a woman and build his own family. The problem is that the role of 
protector and provider seems to be tied to an ability for men to earn an income. 
Unemployment, as we have seen, is a great challenge for the respondents which they have 
reported to be an obstacle in their attempts to provide for their families. What this translates 
to is that being unemployed challenges the respondents' status as breadwinners, heads of 
households and their manhood as expressed through the traditional patriarchal and 
heterosexual discourse. A discourse that in post-liberation South Africa appears to have 
found no material support for these men. The lack of material support places the respondents' 
manhood- heterosexually defined -at stake and risks making them men with bandannas on 
their heads-culturally they stand to be labelled as women. 
6.4 ANC betrayal 
This traditional patriarchal and heterosexual discourse unsupported by a material base--is 
read by the respondents as a betrayal by the ANC government: 
" ... comrades are wearing worn out shoes and when you look at him he looks like a 
'bergie' and if you sit him down you discover that this is the comrade who liberated 
this country but now he cannot face his challenges in life. Sometimes you find that a 
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comrade escapes from stress by drinking alcohol because he cannot cope and when 
you look at his parents' home it is falling apart... he does not know what to do because 
he has no job ... he played his role and it ended and his life ended there too ... he had 
high hopes that the ANC would do this and that because of his contribution in the 
struggle so other comrades end up being mentally disturbed ... " (Thabani). 
"I have strong feelings more especially when it comes to the delivery from the 
government towards ex -combatants ... I feel sometimes .. .1 feel betrayed .. .1 feel 
betrayed, not only myself, when I see things that are happening to other comrades and 
myself I see that no, we are betrayed and neglected, yes" (Philani). 
Matters have also been aggravated by the fact that on returning to South Africa liberation 
fighters were received with excitement, were loved and felt important-they were heroes 
only for a moment: 
Firstly, you found that people were very excited and they loved you and you were 
important. As you walked around the community you heard people saying 'these are 
the people who went to fight in exile'. I mean, I lived a good life and things were 
okay. People would approach me and ask my opinion on the South African situation 
then, they asked 'why did you not fight?' and I would engage with them. In meetings 
you are called to explain and give your opinion on the negotiation process. So we 
were very important at that time ... (Vukani). 
Somewhat cast away and left to their own devices there is some indication that respondents 
may be searching for different ways to be men other than the culturally normative ways of 
being a man. This however should not be interpreted to mean that cultural concepts of 
manhood have been completely abandoned. 
" .. .in the community I playa role especially in the youth ... There is a project that we 
are involved in although it does not pay but we do get tenders. I teach young boys 
traditional dance and that crime does not pay. At school we are invited if there is a 
problem if young boys ... you know how young boys are? They start these gangs and 
so we are there to guide and steer them away from that and to focus them on 
education which is very important and it's their future because we did not get that 
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opportunity to get education but we fought for a better life for all so they must take 
these opportunities instead of doing crimes ... so those are the things that I am doing" 
(Vukani). 
There is something of a parenting role in Vukani' s involvement in the community. He 
teaches dance, steers youth away from crime and encourages them to pursue education. There 
is also here a resemblance of the 'politicisation process' in which Vukani now plays the role 
of the political mature cadre of the struggle in which he conscientises the youth. Having 
experienced apartheid and its fierce opposition in the 1980s, Vukani is well aware of the 
impact of crime and violence in communities, families and individual lives and thus, his 
influence might be considerable in persuading youth from crime and violence. The sacrifices 
he made on his education haunt him today and perhaps his testimony on the importance of 
education may be well received by youth. Ex-combatants like Vukani may therefore, be well 
placed to make a positive contribution in their communities. 
"Yes, we are called the heads of households but women are 'key'. A woman can 
survive without a job and still raise five children on her own and have children who 
are successful in life. So we have to praise women and appreciate them instead of 
raping them and abusing them" (Vukani). 
The recognition of women's roles in the family (a Xhosa cultural marker of manhood) is 
significant. This recognition is important because women can play the role of provider and 
parent even if they are unemployed something which the respondents have found difficult to 
do. Furthermore, recognising that women are 'key' in the family holds possibilities for 
gender equality and a renegotiation of what it means to be a man when women are not held as 
an anti-thesis of masculinity. A masculinity that praises and appreciates women in South 
Africa would mark a new era of what it means to be a man. 
The attempts at identity renegotiation appear, at least in part, to have been facilitated by the 
course attended by the respondents that was a collaboration between three non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). See appendix 4 for an outline of this course. 
Notwithstanding the essentialism and mythic basis of some elements of the course it seems to 
have provided a means for men to end their isolation and fears by affording the respondents 
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(and other participants) opportunities to "express a range of feelings among themselves and 
to talk about their fears, loves and challenges" (Kimmel & Kaufman, 1994, p.283). In this 
way men might begin to make inroads toward "disassociating manhood and domination" 
(ibid.) and grounding it on more egalitarian, respectful, non-violent human connections with 
those around them. Thabani and Philani narratives support this: 
"There is a difference if you attend courses than if you're sitting at home. If you're at 
home you think about a lot of things but in the course you get a lot of ideas from 
people around. Take for instance a comrade might have had a similar problem than 
yours and you get to know how he solved it. .. there are a lot of advice that you get 
from people that you are engaged with" (Thabani). 
" .. .it opened my mind after a number of sessions and I saw things that I did not. The 
way that I was acting, thinking that it was the right way was not the right way. For 
example, when you talk to another person without considering whether the way I 
speak might hurt that person. Even the way, the way you look at a women, you don't 
look at her as a sex object, you see, that course helped me a lot in things like that." 
(Philani) 
It should be noted that NGO initiatives in this study did not provide models of masculinity 
when the respondents returned from exile. As the study has shown, the respondents have 
primarily drawn their sense of manhood from a traditional cultural model characterised by a 
patriarchal and heterosexual discourse. What NGO initiatives seems to have provided is a 
supportive healing space for the respondents, giving them a sense that they are not alone in 
their challenges; a space to reflect on their manhood practices and expression leading to 
possibilities for different and new versions of masculinity that embrace respect for women as 
Philani indicates. Walker (2005) has made the same observation with her respondents who 
were affiliated to the 'Men for Change' (MFC) organisation in Alexandra, Johannesburg. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Aside from the economic policies adopted by the ANC post 1994 that have been argued to 
have greatly disfavoured the poorly educated and unemployed, the respondents' lives and 
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sense of manhood as returned freedom fighters have been shaped by South Africa's poorly 
planned military demobilisation process, social and economic reintegration and key cultural 
concepts of manhood. What is striking is that while apartheid South Africa and exile appear 
to have had some degree of systematic processes (politicisation and military training) that 
facilitated the construction of masculinities, post-liberation South Africa, in contrast, seems 
to have been a haphazard affair with half measures that lacked political will from the ANC. 
Consequently, what seems to have happened is that the respondents' lives as returned 
freedom fighters have been defined more by what they lack in the new dispensation than the 
contribution they made in the struggle for liberation. 
This post-liberation masculinity is a masculinity in transition. This masculinity emerged from 
exile imbued in a patriarchal and heterosexual discourse that posed it as fighter and protector. 
In a civilian space the returned soldier balanced himself between his military masculinity and 
his cultural masculinity which are both held by the same patriarchal and heterosexual 
discourse that posits the former as 'fighter and protector' and the latter as 'provider and 
protector'. In the main though, the returned soldiers have drawn meanings of masculinity 
from their cultural concepts of manhood. This masculinity is, in the first instance, signified 
by a rite of passage into manhood. Secondly, it is tied to an ability to earn an income that is 
'key' to one of the principal markers of manhood in Xhosa culture-being a responsible head 
of the household. Initially the returned soldiers appear to have been well received and 
respected, reinforcing feelings of heroism attendant in the patriarchal and heterosexual 
discourse. 
Beyond these fleeting moments of heroism, there has however, been no material support from 
the ANC government for this cultural masculinity thus, leading to feelings of betrayal. In 
essence this is a lack of support for the patriarchal and heterosexual discourse that has 
obtained between the militarised MK masculinity (notwithstanding its subordination) and the 
post-liberation cultural masculinity. Furthermore, it is also a betrayal of both the youth 
masculinity of 'ungovernability' and the MK militarised masculinity that sacrificed greatly 
for the struggle in the hope of a better life post-liberation. It is this hope that for many ex-
combatants, since 1994, has been on a decline taking with it their sense of dignity, adulthood, 
freedom and manhood-precisely what they sacrificed and struggled for. Lastly, there is 
some indication that these men may be seeking new and different ways of being men that are 
characterised by appreciation of women and making positive contributions in the community 
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CONCLUSION 
This study has explored the constructions of masculinities m changing contexts. Three 
different contexts and three different masculinities have been delineated. Apartheid South 
Africa produced a 'youth struggle masculinity' or a masculinity of 'ungovernability'. Exile 
produced a militarised masculinity and context. Post-liberation South Africa produced a 
masculinity that although culturally inclined is a masculinity in transition. It is important to 
note that although the contexts of these masculinities are different the masculinities are fluid, 
bearing similarities and differences, some of which have already been noted. For example, 
both the 'youth struggle masculinity' and 'militarised masculinity' were imbued with 
revolutionary meanings of furthering the ends of national liberation. In varying degrees both 
were subordinate to other masculinities. And both were held by a hope for a different life post 
the liberation war. 
'Post-liberation cultural masculinity' and 'militarised masculinity' are similar in that both are 
imbued in a patriarchal and heterosexual discourse that positions the latter as 'fighters and 
protector' and the former as 'economic provider and homestead protector'. Youth struggle 
masculinity was political, economically and racially marginalised by the apartheid system 
and subordinate to politically mature ANC cadres. Militarised masculinity was subordinate to 
its commanders and complicit with the subjugation of women. 'Post-liberation masculinity' is 
currently economically marginalised by a democratic capitalistic dispensation. 
Two other themes have penneated this study. First, is the theme of violation in the 
respondents' lives that started with state violence. It is from these violated and subsequently 
volatile lives that the comrade identities emerged as militant and violent identities that have 
been studied by Sitas (1992), Campbell (1992) and Marks (2001). In a different way and 
context this violation continued in the respondents' lives in their military training in MK in 
the form of defacements, dehumanisation, infantilisation and animalisation. What is striking 
here is that in both contexts violation was linked to the formation of masculine identities. 
This link calls for research on how some masculinity practices are not only violent but may 
also constitute a violation of men (Edwards, 2006, p. 62). 
Second, is the theme of education. At the time that the respondents joined MK and left for 
exile it was, among other things, at the cost of their education that had to be disrupted. The 
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importance and role of education in the socialisation of young people has been pointed out by 
Johnson (1982). This disruption is important to note as Talik (1988) argues that although the 
relationship between education and income distribution is complex, education has been 
argued to improve economic equality. Even if for these reason alone, the sacrifice made by 
the respondents on their education is significant. This fact is made clear through the 
challenges that confront the respondents on their return to South Africa post-liberation. The 
enormity of these challenges has implications for the reconstruction and renegotiation of 
masculinities in post-apartheid South Africa. 
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Appendix B 
Stimulus for the Study 
In 2006 I was part of a facilitation team that was assisting in a conference called Memory, 
Narrative and Forgiveness: Reflecting on ten years of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission that was held at the University of Cape Town between 22-27 November. One 
of the discussion sessions was attended by a group of former SDU members from 
Gugulethu and in which Adrian Vlok (apartheid's minister of Law and Order) was also 
present. Adrian Vlok is reported to have not been invited by the organisers of the 
conference. The discussion took a turn when the former SDU members demanded 
answers from Adrian Vlok about events and deaths that had not been accounted for in the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and when the latter was not forthcoming a verbal 
battle ensued. The heated discussion ended in an open podium attracting many people 
and the media and was contained by one of the organisers who took the discussion back 
into the venue. A plea was made for a constructive dialogue and Adrian Vlok promised 
that he would return to Cape Town to have a public dialogue with the Former SDU 
members. After this incident some people who were interested in what the Former (Self 
Defence Units) (SDU) members had been saying gathered around to ask them questions. 
F or the first time I heard primary source accounts of township struggles, of sacrifices, loss 
of lives and a sense of betrayal by the ANC the government. This event led to an interest 
in the liberation struggle that developed to what this study is now concerned about. 
Gaining access to former liberation soldiers 
In retrospect, the relative ease with which I gained access to former liberation soldiers 
could at best be described as a miracle. In March 2007 I attempted to identify organization 
and individuals that had previously worked or were working with MK and APLA ex-
combatants. At this time I was more concerned about collecting academic literature on 
ex-combatants and personal accounts from those who would have had some experience in 
working with ex-combatants. On the suggestion of my supervisor I visited the Institute 
for Justice and Reconciliation in Wynberg where I had a conversation with Cecil Esau (a 
student and political activist who was imprisoned for I2 years in Robben Island during 
apartheid). In our conversation Cecil suggested that I made contact with an organization 
called Direct Action Centre for peace and Memory (DACPM) that was. In the same day 
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I telephone the DACPM and spoke to Mike Adams (a facilitator working at the Centre) 
and we sat an appointment later the same day. In our meeting we discussed my intended 
research after which Mr. Adams mentioned that the Centre works with MK and APLA 
ex-combatants and that a two month course was due to start soon for ex-combatants. Mr. 
Adams invited me as a challenge to register as a participant in the course after which I 
could than ask the former soldiers if they would be willing to be part of the study. I 
immediately accepted the invitation and registered for the course. The course was held at 
the Saartjie Bartman Centre in Athlone twice a week (Tuesday and Thursday between 
08h: 00 and I6h: 00) although I only attended the Thursday sessions due to university 
academic obligations. Tuesday sessions focused on two issues: (I) understanding trauma 
and it impacts and (z) drawing actions plans to facilitate the participants' reintegration 
process. Thursday sessions were focused on understanding masculinity and its impact on 
attempts at reintegration into society (DACPM, zo07). In the first meeting we were asked 
to introduce ourselves and to state how we came to be participants in the course. After 
introducing myself many ex-combatants directed questions at me that focused on the 
research I was intending to do and my educational background, age and where come from. 
Overall some seemed to be skeptical and somewhat irked by my presence which I 
attributed to the fact that I am not an ex-combatant. From the outset I consciously 
decided to have conversations with the former soldiers during tea breaks and soon I had 
close relations with most of the fourteen former soldiers and shared meals during lunch 
breaks. At the end of the course (the course had started on I March and ended on 3 April) 
five former soldiers agreed to be interviewed for the study. 
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Appendix C 
A Psycho-social reintegration course for ex-combatants: 
Three collaborating Non-government organisations 
An organization established and run by former combatants, Direct Action Centre for Peace 
and Memory (DACPM) envisions a world in which the historical, structural, and 
systematic injustices of post-conflict communities are adequately commemorated, 
addressed, and transformed, thus ensuring greater peace and human security for all 
(DACPM, n.d). DACPM's specific purpose is to reduce the violence against men, women 
and children by improving the capacity of black men, particularly those who have been 
directly affected by political violence in South Africa, to address the manifold challenges 
facing them, their families and their communities (DACPM, n.d). 
The Trauma Centre for Survivors of Violence and Torture grew out of a partnership of 
progressive mental health organisations. The Trauma Centre caters for the mental health 
needs of ex-political prisoners, returned exiles and other victims of political violence and 
repression. Since 1993, the Trauma Centre has grown and evolved, in response to the 
changing needs of the population. Today the organisation comprises nearly 30 staff 
members involved in rendering the following programmes: Trauma Response (Crisis & 
Continuous trauma), Political Violence (Torture and Refugee Projects), Children and 
Violence and Training (Trauma Centre, n.d). 
Hearst of Men strives to provide mentoring, educational and social guidance to young 
people at risk in order for them to become community builders contributing to sustainable 
peace and crime prevention. Hearst of Men aims to: Provide social guidance and support to 
young men within a community setting, to assist them through the passage to manhood, 
to develop the leadership skills of young people in the community and facilitate youth 
leadership training workshops focusing on Youth Development Basic Counselling Skills, 
HIV / Aids training, Drug and Alcohol- Abuse Awareness Mentor Training, Wilderness 
Support and Environmental Training, First- aid training and Panel beating (Hearts of 
Men, n.d). 
Context of the course 
From 1976 to the late 1980s thousands of young men and women between 14 and 18 years 
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left school to join MK or APLA in exile, other were imprisoned, tortured and killed. This 
intensified in the 1980s which has been officially recognised to have been the most violent 
period in the three decades of the struggle against apartheid (DACPM, zo07). There was 
ceasefire in 1990 and in 1994 South Africa had its first democratic election, and yet the 
scores of young people were left with the legacy and consequences of their participation in 
the armed liberation struggle as they were unsuccessfully reintegrated into the new 
democratic dispensation (DACPM, zo07). Although many have since reintegrated, have 
gone through self development programs, reconciliation, healing process and are 
employed (see Gear, zooz and Greenbaum, zo06) many have not moved beyond their 
militarised identities (DACPM, zo07). It is with this group of ex-combatants that the 
Centre works to assist with the process of reintegration and healing. 
Many returned to their families and communities and became an added burden as these 
communities were characterized by high levels of crime and violence, extreme poverty, 
unemployment, underdevelopment an limited education al opportunities (DACPM, 
zo07). Government interventions have been crippled by: 
• The scarcity of human and financial resources, management abilities and 
leadership qualities to intervene successfully. 
• The lack of coordination between local, provincial and national government and 
non-profit organizations and other service providers. 
• Governmental demobilization and military integration processes have been and 
continue to be poorly managed mostly with very little consultation with the 
combatants themselves and this has left demobilized combatants isolated, 
frustrated and demoralized (DACPM, Z007). 
On this backdrop the challenges facing ex-combatants are complex and varied. In zo06 the 
DACPM decided to strengthen and deepen the support it offered to ex-combatants 
through regularizing self development courses to support them in their reintegration 
attempts (DACPM, zo07). The course was called "Warriors for Peace: Psycho-social 
reintegration course for Former Guerrilla's in our Liberation armies". My involvement in this 
course was outlined in the chapter two. 
The course had eight modules of which we are concerned with the module entitled 
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'Reclaiming your Heart'. The interest on this module is that it was considered by 
DACPM to be a "key methodological component of the course ... " (DACPM, 2007, p. 9) 
and was aimed at addressing issues of masculinity and reintegration into society. Some of 
the themes in the module include: competition among men, loneliness and fear, 
relationships between men, women and children, support and communications as key 
pillars to successful relationships, absent fathers and time management. Moreover the 
module had a three day wilderness camp called 'Wild at Heart' that was intended to give 
"participants a chance to travel deep inside themselves. This is achieved through a 
combination of solo time, storytelling ... The three days spent out in the mountains gives 
participants a chance to ... travel inwards into the source of their pain, trauma and other 
difficulties." (DACPM, 2007, p. 9)' 
In personal communication (06/01/09) with Desmond van Niekerk a leader and 
facilitator in the 'Reclaiming your Heart' module he stated that the module was primarily 
targeted at the participants as men and only secondarily as former soldiers. Mr. van 
Niekerk maintained that the focus on returned soldiers as men was informed by the 
thinking that there is a difference between the military in exile and the family in civilian 
life and the challenge for former soldiers is to learn not to run their families like the 
military. It was striking that although Mr. van Niekerk recognized the difference 
between the military and the family he nevertheless viewed both to be terrains of battle 
stating that "war in exile is different from war at home and former soldiers must face 
challenges at home and the marketplace as men and not as soldiers. The problem facing 
former soldiers is that "because in the military they lived on command they want to live 
their civilian lives in the same way except that now they want to be the commanders 
ordering people and situations." 
Important to note here is that although the respondents are recognized as men instead of 
soldiers they are still referred to and encouraged to see themselves as men who are still at 
war. The challenges and changes they face constitute the war they are now engaged in 
which although they share with other former soldiers remain a deeply personal war 
requiring them to travel inwards into the source of their pain, trauma and other 
difficulties (DACPM, 2007). The Marxist thinking that posited revolutionaries as 
individuals who were to expect nothing at the personal but had to be prepared and willing 
to sacrifice all personal needs in service of the struggle (Suttner, 2008), seems to be no 
longer upheld by the ANC thus, the war they are engaged in, is not one for national 
93 
liberation but perhaps personal liberation from the "plight of the ex~combatants". This is 
partly why the module facilitated by the 'Trauma Centre' attempted to help the 
respondents draw action plans for addressing their challenges. 
Moreover, Mr. van Niekerk states that "the module drew on the my tho poetic men's 
movement and specifically on Robert Bly's Iron John story" that informed the view of the 
returned soldiers as wounded men whose masculinity was lost in the war and military 
life. Iron John (a seminal text of the mythopoetic movement) is a replica of Iron Hans, a 
German fairy tale published by Wilhelm Grimm in 1850 (Zipes, 1992). The Brothers 
Grimm in 1815, published a tale entitled The Wild Man that was based on a dialect that 
they had obtained from the aristocratic family von Haxthausen (Zipes, 1992). 
The Iron John story according to Mr. van N iekerk was interpreted by 'Heart of Men' as 
depicting a young man who was impressed by the power and stature of Iron John and 
who on escaping with Iron John comes to discover who he is away from home and the 
familiar. For 'Hearts of Men', as Mr. van Niekerk explained "the young man represents 
the respondents as young men who left their homes and went into the military and there 
were under the domination of commanders as particular kinds of fathers who somehow 
facilitated a loss of manhood in the soldiers." In other words, it was in this commander~ 
soldier relation within military discourse that military men were made who ironically 
also lost their sense of manhood. Mr. van Niekerk does not explain how he or Heart of 
Men conceives masculinity or what is meant by a 'loss of manhood' but rather there 
seems to be a subscription to mythopoetic concepts of manhood. This thinking is 
standard in the mythopoetic men's movement where manhood is seen to be a deeply 
seated essence waiting to be activated in the social world; it is intrinsic to every man, 
transhistorical and culturally universal (Kimmel and Kaufman, 1994). As Bly envisions it 
"the structure at the bottom of the male psyche is still as firm as it was twenty thousand 
years ago" (Bly, 1990 cited in Kimmel and Kaufman, 1994). This study challenges this 
vIew as false. Chapter four showed that the respondents' masculine identities were 
constructed within a particular historical period of apartheid and struggle. To speak in 
Bourdieu's language: who the respondents were as youth was as a result of the habitus 
they embodied as individuals through their lived experience of apartheid and subsequent 
politicisation. Beyond the personal their masculinities were formed within a collective, 
historical and social context that was far from universal. This means that the respondents 
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masculinities were from the time of their politicisation, in the military and now in post~ 
liberation South Africa were bound and continue to be bound in particular historical 
context that have never been static. 
Although the 'Hearts of Men' interpretation of Iron John did not urge the respondents to 
retrieve the transhistorical Wild Man within them as Robert Bly does in his book the 
respondents were nonetheless conceived as 'warriors' as the title of the course indicates. 
Bly argues for a distinction between a soldier, who for him is a murderer, and a true 
warrior, who is a defender of his integrity and soul (Zipes, 1992). The problem though is 
that Bly also sees the Wild Man as a true warrior imbued in Zeus energy, resolve, courage 
and purity who is distinct from the savage man who is equated to greed, rapacity, 
destruction and dishonesty (Zipes, 1992). Although the 'Wild Man' was not directly 
referred to he [Wild Man] was invoked by referring to the respondents as 'warriors' 
within the mythopoetic discourse embedded in the course. Another link with the Wild 
Man is suggested by the 'Wild at Heart' retreat where the journey "deep inside" suggests 
itself to have been a journey to recuperate the Wild Man's heart. The portrayal of civilian 
life for the returned soldiers as a 'war' is in keeping with their portrayal as 'warriors' that 
are distinct from soldiers. We can understand who this warrior is when Mr. van N iekerk 
asserts that "the lost sense of manhood is the value for community and family and the 
connection with women, children and other men and nature." What remains unexplained 
is what is meant by connection for surely exile and the totality of military life provided 
some form of connection between men. 
Aside from what remains unexplained, the first obvious problem here is that this way of 
being a man, of being a warrior is said to have been lost yet this study did not find it to 
have been present to begin within the respondents' lives whose initial sense of manhood 
were formed in a society in political and violent conflict. This then is a nostalgic longing 
for a past that did not really exist (Kimmel and Kaufman, 1994). Secondly, the association 
and invocation of the Wild Man or at least his heart is problematic: What Bly seems to 
forget and consequently to mention is that the Wild Man, aside from being demonic, in 
both the Grimm's version and his own, is that the Wild Man also is a killer. At the 
beginning of both Iron Hans and The Wild Man, the wild man kills all the hunters who 
enter the forest (Zipes, 1992). Lastly, there is nothing universal about the Wild Man or 
what has been attributed to him. He also "does not owe a great debt to some mythical pre~ 
Greek or pre~Christian tale, but it can very clearly be traced to an aristocratic literary 
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tradition that contained pagan and Christian elements and to European folklore of the 
Middle Ages. In many respects, the tale bears similarity to an initiation process that a 
young aristocrat was expected to undergo in European Middle Ages to become a warrior 
and king" (Zipes, 1992, p. II). Like Zeus the Wild Man is a fairy tale and a mythic warrior 
hero whose masculine virtue is the brain child of Robert Bly. 
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